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define individual words; they don’t typically define phrases or allow for consideration 
of broader linguistic context. And while dictionaries can provide a list of possible 
senses, they can’t tell us which sense is the most ordinary (or common). 
Originalists have also turned to other methods, but those methods have also fallen 
short. But all is not lost. Big data—and the tools of linguists—have the potential to 
bring greater rigor and transparency to the practice of originalism. This article will 
explore the application of corpus linguistic methodology to aid originalism’s inquiry 
into the original communicative content of the Constitution. We propose to improve 
this inquiry by use of a newly released corpus (or database) of founding-era texts: the 
beta version of the Corpus of Founding-Era American English. 
This paper will showcase how typical tools of a corpus—concordance lines, 
collocation, clusters (or n-grams), and frequency data—can aid in the search for 
original communicative content. We will also show how corpus data can help 
determine whether a word or phrase in question is best thought of as an ordinary one 
or a legal term of art. To showcase corpus linguistic methodology, this paper will 
analyze important clauses in the Constitution that have generated litigation and 
controversy over the years (commerce, public use, and natural born citizen) and 
another whose original meaning has been presumed to be clear (domestic violence). 
We propose best practices, and also discuss the limitations of corpus linguistic 
methodology for originalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A threshold inquiry for any problem of interpretation concerns the 
“communicative content” of the text. Any attempt to give legal meaning to 
the words of the law begins with “linguistic meaning.”1 Sometimes we stop 
there. If the communicative content of the law is clear, we give that content 
controlling legal significance.2 
This is the “standard picture” of interpretation.3 Most of the difficulties 
arise in cases where the standard picture is unclear. The divisions among 
textualists and purposivists in statutory interpretation, for example, go to the 
likelihood of finding ambiguity in the search for communicative content, and 
to the proper tools and course for resolving such ambiguity. But everyone 
starts at the same place—at communicative content—and ends there if the 
standard picture is sufficiently clear. 
Constitutional interpretation is no different in this respect. In this field, 
we also start with the operative text. And again we end there where the 
communicative content of the Constitution is clear. 
We may not often end there. We may rarely conclude that the standard 
constitutional picture is clear, particularly on questions that get litigated in our 
courts. But still this is the starting point. And no one doubts that the standard 
picture is sometimes crystal clear. Article II, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution says that no person “who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty-five Years” is “eligible” to serve as President of the United States.4 No 
one who is trying to interpret those words would say that a thirty-year-old is 
eligible for the presidency.5 That’s because we can all agree on what it means 
 
1 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479, 480 (2013) (distinguishing the “communicative content” of a legal text from its “legal content,” 
or in other words “the legal norms the text produces”). 
2 There are caveats, of course—like the doctrine of absurdity. But this is the general rule. See 
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756–58 (2010) (concluding, based on a comprehensive 
study of state court approaches to statutory interpretation, that such courts give primacy to text and 
decline to look to external sources of meaning if they find the text “plain,” and asserting that “these 
state efforts . . . respond directly to the leading academic proposals advanced to make federal 
statutory interpretation more determinate”). 
3 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 
1086 (2017) (speaking of the “standard picture,” or “view that we can explain our legal norms by 
pointing to the ordinary communicative content of our legal texts,” or, in other words, “an 
instrument’s meaning as a matter of language”); see also id. at 1082 n.2 (borrowing the “standard 
picture” terminology from Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011)). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
5 But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional: The Case for President Strom 
Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 220 (1996) (presenting a tongue-in-cheek case for the 
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to have “attained to the Age of thirty-five Years”; the communicative content 
of that proviso is clear in foreclosing the eligibility of anyone younger. 
A principal complication for constitutional interpretation, of course, is the 
added time dimension.6 Thus, most of the action in the theory of constitutional 
interpretation concerns the question of how to deal with the fact that the 
Constitution (unlike most operative statutes) was written centuries ago, in a 
dialect that is, at least in some respects, unfamiliar to the twenty-first-century 
ear. This is the problem of linguistic drift—the notion that language usage and 
meaning shifts over time. And this raises the question of which standard picture 
to credit: the picture as it would have been viewed at the time of the 
Constitution’s founding, or the picture as seen by the modern jurist? 
For some constitutional questions, the time difference won’t matter. We 
can assume (though this proposition could be tested—more on that below), 
for example, that our system for accounting a person’s age has not changed 
since the founding of the Constitution. And if so, then a commitment to 
following the communicative content of the law should foreclose the 
eligibility of our thirty-year-old candidate.7 
But of course there are other provisions of the Constitution for which that 
would not hold. One example is the Domestic Violence Clause—the 
provision in Article IV, Section 4 that provides that “[t]he United States . . . 
shall protect” each state in the union “against Invasion” and “on Application 
of the Legislature . . . against domestic Violence.”8 This clause is viewed as 
having undergone linguistic drift in the relevant timeframe. It apparently 
meant insurrection or uprising in the eighteenth  century, but “domestic 
violence” is understood to refer to an assault against a member of a person’s 
household today. This can also be tested; we do so below. 
That frames the threshold question for constitutional interpretation. 
When the language of the Constitution is understood in one way today but 
can be shown to have had a different communicative content historically (at 
its adoption), which is the relevant standard picture? If a state legislature 
 
proposition that the age standard in Article II should be allowed to evolve over time; asserting that 
“[m]aturity is the key, as measured by a proportion of the normal expected lifespan”; and concluding 
that the comparable standard of maturity in our era is “something more like ‘fifty-nine-and-a-half’”). 
6 Another is the fact that the Constitution, in some instances, speaks in sweeping vagaries with 
weak communicative content. We address that complication later. See infra Part II. 
7 That candidate might mount other arguments against this conclusion. But he would not be 
in any position to challenge the threshold communicative content of Article II, Section 1. In this 
sense the language of the Constitution is at least sometimes constraining—or at least to some extent. 
Cf. William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2215 (2017) 
(suggesting that proponents of the “constraint” premise of originalism “no longer have a clear 
champion”); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714–15 (2011) 
(asserting that “[j]udicial constraint” was once the “heart and soul” of originalism but has since “sold 
its soul to gain respect and adherents”). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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declares a “domestic violence” epidemic in the twenty-first century sense of 
that phrase, is the federal government obliged to marshal national guard 
forces in response to the state’s request for protection? 
Here again we find more consensus than dispute. If the eighteenth-
century understanding of “domestic violence” is clear in its reference to an 
insurrection, then all prevailing approaches to originalism would credit that 
understanding. Most of the action in the interpretive battle in this field 
concerns what to do in the face of ambiguity as to the original meaning of the 
constitutional text. Where the original meaning is clear, almost everyone 
agrees that that meaning controls. The hypothetical request for federal troops 
to deal with modern domestic violence would be laughed out of court. And 
that’s because almost everyone agrees with what Professor Larry Solum calls 
the “Fixation Thesis”—the notion that the communicative content of an 
historical legal document is fixed at the time it was adopted—at least in the 
(rare) circumstance in which its original communicative content is clear.9 
Even careful “living” originalists presumably would agree with this 
proposition. They are just less likely to believe that many principles of the 
Constitution have a clearly ascertainable original meaning. Jack Balkin, for 
example, draws a distinction between the basic “framework” of the 
Constitution (which is conceded to be clearly established, fixed, and limiting) 
and the “build out” on top of the established framework (the details of which 
are not prescribed by any fixed original meaning, and which can be added on 
top of the original framework in a process of “construction” that is not 
constrained by original meaning).10 Even for a living originalist like Jack 
Balkin, the question is which of the provisions of the Constitution have clear 
communicative content. Most everyone would agree that some provisions are 
clear. The key problems concern (a) how to figure out whether they are clear; 
(b) what degree of clarity is required before we deem the document to 
constrain; and (c) what to do when the required clarity is absent. 
All the action in the theory of constitutional interpretation is thus after 
the threshold inquiry into original communicative content.11 Within the 
 
9 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015). 
10 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 560-61 (2009) (“Living constitutionalism concerns the process of constitutional construction. 
Framework originalism leaves space for future generations to build out and construct the 
Constitution-in-practice. Living constitutionalism occupies this space. It explains and justifies the 
process of building on and building out.”). 
11 This is not to say that every constitutional case begins with originalist analysis. There are 
many fields of constitutional law that have been completely overtaken by precedent. When an extent 
of the precedent in a particular field is rich and the communicative content of the underlying 
constitutional provision is poor (as with doctrines of substantive due process), we may expect a court 
to begin and end its analysis with the body of precedent without stopping to inquire into original 
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family of originalist theories, we may disagree on the proper means of 
resolving ambiguity as to original meaning—by resort to tools for assessing 
language usage among members of the general public, by reference to 
writings of framers or ratifiers, by incorporation of tools of interpretation 
employed by lawyers and jurists at the time of the framing, or otherwise. And 
we may disagree on what to do if we cannot ultimately resolve the problem 
of ambiguity by use of these tools—on whether to fall back on presumption 
of constitutionality premised in a burden of proof, or whether to acknowledge 
a zone of “construction” that invites tools aimed at establishing “legal 
content” having nothing to do with the threshold inquiry into communicative 
content. But we all start at the same place—and agree to stop there if the 
standard picture is clear. 
For all our agreement on the significance of this important starting point, we 
have no established methodology for assessing the original communicative content 
of the Constitution.12 To date we have paid little attention to the reliability of our 
methods for this assessment. And the means we have used fall short in several 
ways. In this Article, we highlight some problems with the standard approach to 
this inquiry and propose a tool for addressing the deficiencies. 
In Part I, we show that the inquiry into original communicative content is 
the starting point for all originalist methodologies—and can be the end point 
if such content is unambiguous. In Part II, we describe prevailing methods for 
assessing original communicative content and identify shortcomings of these 
methods. Part III introduces a tool for assessing original communicative 
content—a tool used in a field called corpus linguistics, a field that looks for 
patterns in meaning and usage in large databases (corpora) of naturally 
occurring language. Part IV shows how this tool can be used to find the 
original communicative content of provisions of the Constitution. Here and 
elsewhere, we consider the original meaning of domestic violence as well as three 
important questions of originalist inquiry addressed in high-profile cases—the 
scope of the commerce power under Article I, Section 8; the nature of public use 
 
communicative content. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-2605 (2015) (detailing 
the “substantial body of law considering all sides” of the issue of same-sex marriage). But that doesn’t 
mean that originalism isn’t the threshold inquiry; it just means that there is a body of precedent that 
gives the court a platform for bypassing it. 
12 See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 116 (2018) (asserting, in contrasting the 
inquiry into original intent with the inquiry into original public meaning, that the former has “at 
least” one advantage over the latter—it is “an empirical question requiring investigation into the 
words, minds, and actions” of the framers or ratifiers; and contending that “[t]he search for original 
objective meaning, by contrast, is a theoretical inquiry requiring the judge to don the mantle of a 
hypothetical objective person living centuries ago,” a purportedly “much more difficult, if not 
impossible, task”); see also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
254-55 (2009) (“[A] newer generation of originalists . . . do not concern themselves with how the 
words of the Constitution were actually understood by the Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or 
anyone else, but rather with how a hypothetical, reasonable person should have understood them.”). 
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under the Takings Clause; and the meaning of natural born citizen in Article II, 
Section 5. Then in Part V, we conclude with some observations about how we 
see corpus analysis fitting into prevailing originalist methodologies, and some 
concessions on limitations of this tool. And we conclude with some 
observations about how corpus linguistics could help provide both external 
and internal restraint to judges. 
I. THE CENTRALITY OF THE INQUIRY INTO ORIGINAL 
COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT 
Others have laid some of the groundwork that we begin with here. Recent 
scholarship has shown that the “originalist family” of theories “agree that the 
communicative content of the constitutional text was fixed at the time each 
provision was framed and ratified.”13 The differences among originalists go to 
the nature and means of the inquiry into original communicative content. Yet 
all originalists effectively begin with an inquiry into the original communicative 
content of the constitutional text. Below we highlight the centrality of the 
inquiry into original communicative content in each of three prevailing theories 
of originalism (public meaning, original intent, and methods originalism). 
A. Public Meaning Originalism 
The case for the primacy of original communicative content is 
straightforward under public meaning originalism. The whole point of this 
“new originalist” theory was to shift the focus away from mere intentions of 
the framers and to inquire instead into the public meaning of the 
constitutional text. This was a response to criticisms highlighting “the 
difficulty of ascertaining the original intentions of a document drafted by a 
multimember constitutional convention and ratified by an even larger group 
who met in conventions convened in each state.”14 To address that concern, 
original public meaning originalists turned the focus away from framers’ 
intentions and toward the public’s understanding of the text. For the original 
public meaning originalist, the original meaning of the Constitution “that was 
proposed in 1787 was necessarily determined in large part by the conventional 
semantic meanings of the words and phrases that make up the text and the 
regularities of usage that are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and 
syntax.”15 
 
13 Solum, supra note 9, at 7; accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, § 7, at 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning 
they had when the text was adopted.”). 
14 Solum, supra note 9, at 4. 
15 Id. at 28. 
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This is an originalist “standard picture.” It is an inquiry into the 
communicative content of provisions of the Constitution as they would have 
been understood by the public in the late eighteenth century. And it looks for 
evidence of “conventional semantic meaning” in the usage and linguistic 
conventions of that time. 
B. Original Intentions Originalism 
An “original intentions” originalist looks for meaning that is “fixed by the 
intentions of the framers of the text.”16 Thus, this variation on originalism 
may seem more interested in the writings and advocacy of the framers—in 
the Federalist Papers, for example, or the records of the constitutional 
convention—than in semantic evidence of the meaning of the words they 
wrote in the constitution. If so, original intent originalism might be thought 
of as eschewing the inquiry into the communicative content of the text. 
But a more careful consideration of this branch of originalism uncovers 
more common ground than disagreement. For thoughtful original intent 
originalists, the relevant “original intentions” are not “applicative” but 
“communicative”: “Thus, the intent of a constitutional provision is a mental 
state that specifies the communicative content which the framers of that 
provision intended to convey through the provision.”17 We can think of 
“intentions” as “mental states.” Yet the relevant mental state is not an 
aspiration privately held by the framers; it is an intention “encoded in 
linguistic representations” in the text of the Constitution.18 This means that 
the framers’ writings or advocacy are not direct evidence of the relevant 
original communicative content; they are indirect evidence that could help 
fill in gaps of underdeterminacy.19 And that brings us back to a search for the 
original communicative content of the text of the Constitution.20 
 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
18 Id. at 27. 
19 See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the 
Constitutional Record, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1621, 1671   [hereinafter Triangulating Public Meaning] 
(“[D]rafting history can provide evidence of conventional semantic meaning, but this role is 
evidential.”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 284 (2017) 
(speaking of corpus linguistics as providing “primary evidence” of the relevant “patterns of usage” 
and original semantic meaning). 
20 Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash thoughtfully question the notion of “intention free 
textualism”—”the position that texts can be interpreted without any reference, express or implied, 
to the meaning intended by the author of the text.” Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That 
English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967, 968 (2004). They identify persuasive grounds for questioning our ability to resolve ambiguities 
in the meaning of a given text without resort to authorial intention. But they do not seem to 
ultimately question the salience of the author’s text—or to suggest that an author’s privately held 
“intention” could override clear meaning in the words he uses. 
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There is a parallel here to contemporary approaches to statutory 
interpretation.21 “We are all textualists now”22 in the sense that even 
purposivist inquiries to statutory interpretation find the text to be the best 
evidence of legislative purpose, and deem themselves bound by the clear 
meaning of the purpose as stated in the text when it is unambiguous.23 In a 
similar sense, it could be said that we are all “original public meaning” 
originalists now.24 That holds true to the extent that the original 
communicative content of the words of the Constitution is clearly 
established. Where that holds, no thoughtful “original intent” originalist 
would seek to override the original public meaning with evidence of a 
framer’s privately held intentions. 
The above-noted example under the Domestic Violence Clause illustrates 
the point. If domestic violence is shown widely to have been understood to refer 
to a rebellion or uprising, and (almost?) never to speak of an act of assault in 
a person’s household, then that should be the end of the inquiry even for a 
proponent of “original intent” originalism. That original communicative 
 
Instead, these authors’ thesis seems to be that ambiguities in the meaning of a text cannot be 
resolved without consideration of authorial intent. Thus, Alexander and Prakash argue that it is not 
possible to discern the “man on the street” meaning a of text by a “sample of average members of 
the public.” Id. at 984. A principal concern here is “how much background context” to attribute to 
the “average interpreter.” Id. “If we take the law to mean whatever it would mean to a collection of 
people who are provided no context whatsoever—other than, perhaps, that its authors were English 
speakers and enacted the law on a given date—then we might as well construct a computer program 
that incorporates dateable dictionaries and rules of syntax, grammar, and punctuation and ask the 
computer to spit out the law’s meaning.” Id. We think Alexander and Prakash were partly onto 
something here. We see corpus linguistic analysis as a means of finding “average interpreter” 
meaning. And we try to show that this tool can (at least sometimes) provide reliable empirical 
evidence of “average interpreter” meaning, and can do so in light of relevant linguistic context. 
21 See Chris Wallace, Interview with Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Fox News Sunday 
(July 29, 2012) (Justice Scalia, asserting that “[o]riginalism is sort of a subspecies of textualism”), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/2012/07/29/interview_with_supreme_court_justice_anto 
nin_scalia_286094.html [https://perma.cc/Q2VH-9BCS]. 
22 Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at 
8:28, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scali-lecture-kagan-
discusses-statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]. 
23 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
60 (2d ed. 2013) (“Over the last quarter-century, textualism has had an extraordinary influence on 
how federal courts approach questions of statutory interpretation. When the Court finds the text to 
be clear in context, it now routinely enforces the statute as written.”); Gluck, supra note 2, at 1756–
58 (showing that state supreme courts consistently give primacy to text and decline to look to 
external sources of meaning if they find the text “plain”). 
24 Justice Elena Kagan and Professor Lawrence Tribe have made similar observations. See 
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment (summarizing Ronald Dworkin’s comments in the same volume), in 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 65, 67 (1997) ; Jonathan H. Adler, The 
Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST (June 29, 2010, 1:18 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062902652.html 
[https://perma.cc/PS3F-9CTB] (reporting that during her confirmation hearings, Elena Kagan 
declared, “We are all originalists”). 
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content, after all, is the best evidence of the framers’ intentions as encoded 
in the Domestic Violence Clause. And even a committed original 
intentionalist would not be in a position to argue for overriding that intention 
with contrary evidence of a framer’s idiosyncratic views. This should hold, at 
least, where the evidence of intent as encoded in the text is clear. And that 
suggests that the threshold inquiry for original intentionalists should be the 
same—they should look first for the original communicative content of the 
words of the Constitution. 
C. Methods Originalism 
This should also hold for “original methods” originalists. The principal 
contribution of this theory is to posit that the Constitution was written in a 
distinct “dialect”—in the language of the law of the eighteenth century—and 
to suggest that we can decode this dialect only by immersing ourselves in the 
language community of that dialect.25 This move was aimed, at least in part, 
at questioning the basis for “construction” of the Constitution to extend its 
terms beyond the “interpretation” of its communicative content. John 
McGinnis and Mike Rappaport are the chief proponents of this methodology. 
They have advocated that gaps in the Constitution’s communicative content 
can be filled in by acknowledging the distinct dialect of the Constitution and 
by ascertaining the communicative content of the words of the document 
using canons and methods of interpretation that would have been used by 
lawyers and judges in the eighteenth century. 
But this approach does not at all eschew a threshold inquiry into the 
communicative content of the constitutional text. It doesn’t even deny that 
some provisions of the Constitution are framed in ordinary language—and not 
the language of the law. Thus, a principal difference (to the extent there is 
one) between the original public meaning originalists and the original 
methods originalists concerns the degree to which each believes that the 
Constitution speaks in ordinary terms or in a distinct dialect of the law. And 
that means that original methods originalists should also begin with an inquiry 
into the communicative content of the words of the Constitution (at least for 
terms used in their ordinary sense—a question often begged by theorists, and 
which we can also measure using the tools that we introduce below).26 
 
25 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory 
of Originalism and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751-52 (2009) (stating that 
“original methods originalism provides the most accurate method for determining the original 
meaning of the Constitution”). 
26 In this sense, the divide between public-meaning originalism and methods originalism 
seems more apparent than real. Both are aiming for public meaning in the relevant dialect. And both 
acknowledge that the Constitution seems to speak in two dialects. The real difference between these 
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McGinnis and Rappaport root their theory in the proposition that the 
Constitution is written in legal language that “overlays ordinary language.”27 
So although they view the document as having been “written in the language 
of the law,” they also concede that it “contains both ordinary language and legal 
language.”28 This suggests that courts should give legal terms legal meaning. But 
it also suggests, as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport note, that “[t]erms that 
have only ordinary meanings are given their ordinary meanings.”29 
McGinnis and Rappaport seek to categorize legal terms that appear in the 
Constitution. They first assert that thirteen terms are unambiguously legal 
terms—such as writ of habeas corpus, original jurisdiction, and attainder of 
treason.30 Next they identify another forty-four terms as ambiguous, 
suggesting that the terms in this category have both a legal meaning and an 
ordinary meaning.31 A third group of terms are those the authors see as 
“possibly” having “a legal meaning in addition to their ordinary 
meaning.”32 This latest group includes natural born citizen; perhaps it could 
also include commerce and public use. 
In light of the above, we infer that these theorists would view domestic 
violence as an ordinary term—not legalese. (This is a testable hypothesis, as 
we show in Part IV below.) And so we conclude that the original methods 
originalist (like the public meaning and intent originalist) would find 
controlling significance in the determination that the phrase domestic violence 
would have been understood by the general public to refer to an uprising or 
a rebellion—and not an assault against a member of a household. 
II. PREVAILING APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION AND 
MEASUREMENT OF ORIGINAL COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT 
The above highlights the centrality of the inquiry into original 
communicative content for originalist interpretation of the Constitution (and 
even for the nonoriginalist who believes that original meaning at least 
sometimes is fixed). That leaves the question of how to define and measure 
that content. Here we describe prevailing approaches to the definition and 
measurement of original communicative content. We also highlight 
shortcomings in our existing methodologies. 
 
two theories goes to the means of closing the gap in indeterminate communicative content—whether 
by recognition of a construction zone or by original methods. 
27 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2018). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1326-27 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. at 137071. 
31 Id. at 1371. 
32 Id. at 1374. 
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A. The Meaning of Meaning: Prevailing Approaches to Communicative Content 
When originalist theorists speak of the original communicative content of 
the Constitution, they begin by considering “the conventional semantic 
meaning of the words and phrases” as they appear in the Constitution, 
“composed into larger units by syntax.”33 Yet they also acknowledge a role for 
what linguists speak of as “pragmatics”—the nonsemantic “context” of a given 
provision of the Constitution, which is understood to affect the 
understanding of communicative content. 
Scholars have identified several “forms of contextual enrichment” that 
may be relevant to discerning the communicative content of the Constitution. 
These include (1) impliciture, essentially an implied ellipsis, as in the idea that 
the Article I, Section 9 proviso that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto 
Law shall be passed” includes an implied “[by Congress] as an impliciture;” 34 
(2) presupposition, or an implication “that is presupposed by what is said in a 
particular context,” as exemplified by the Ninth Amendment, which states 
that the Constitution’s enumeration of rights “shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people,” and thus presupposes that “there 
are rights that are retained by the people;”35 and (3) modulation, the use of “an 
old word [] in a new way” in a particular context, as with the use of “recess” 
in the Recess Appointments Clause.36 
 
33 Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 19, at 272; see also KURT T. LASH, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP 277 (2014) (“I have defined original meaning as the likely original understanding of the 
text at the time of its adoption by competent speakers of the English language who are aware of the 
context in which the text was communicated for ratification. Rather than seeking framers’ intentions 
or linguistically possible interpretations, my effort has been to identify patterns of usage that signal 
commonly accepted meaning.”); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection 
Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C. R. L.J. 1, 12 (2008) (“[O]ne should look for what 
readers of the historically-situated text would have understood the constitutional language to 
express.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 291, 398 (2002) (trying to determine “the meaning the language [of the Constitution] would 
have had . . . to an average, informed speaker and reader of that language at the time of its enactment 
into law”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118, 1131 (2003) (seeking to understand “the meaning the words 
and phrases of the Constitution would have had, in context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers 
of the English language, reading a document of this type, at the time adopted”—the “meaning [words 
and phrases of the Constitution’s text] would have had at the time they were adopted as law, within 
the [legal] and linguistic community that adopted the text as law”). . 
34 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1635.  
35 Id. at 1636. 
36 Id. . 
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Careful theorists also distinguish “original expected applications” from 
the original communicative content of the constitutional text.37 One scholar 
makes the distinction by reference to the Second Amendment. He says that 
the inquiry into the original communicative content of the “right to bear 
arms” is aimed at discerning the understanding of that phrase in its semantic 
and pragmatic context. And he distinguishes that content from expected 
applications—e.g., the belief “that muskets and flintlocks were ‘arms’ within 
the meaning of the Second Amendment,” or the belief that a particular 
individual was old enough to be eligible to serve as President of the United 
States under Article Two, Section 1.38 
“Original expected applications” are relevant under this view, but they 
bear only evidentiary significance. “Thus, if the framers believed that muskets 
and flintlocks were ‘arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment, 
that fact is evidence that favors any theory of the meaning of arms that 
encompasses muskets and flintlocks and is evidence that disfavors any 
interpretation that would exclude them.”39 Yet there may also “be cases where 
application expectations are incorrect.”40 Here we can return to the Article II 
age requirement. “[I]f the members of the Philadelphia Convention had a 
false belief about the age of a potential presidential candidate, such that the 
individual would not have been eligible for election to the presidency in 1782 
(because the individual was actually thirty-two and not thirty-six), the 
expectation that the Article Two requirement that the President be 35 years 
of age would be satisfied does not provide evidence that the phrase ‘the age 
of thirty five years’ had some weird meaning . . . .”41 Where the 
communicative content of a provision is clear, we can simply assume the 
existence of a “factual error” about an expected application. And, in that 
instance, the probative value of the expected application will fail to override 
our clear understanding of original communicative content. 
The original communicative content will not, of course, always be clear. 
Originalist theory recognizes that the bare communicative content will be 
“sparse” for some provisions of the Constitution and “rich” for others.42 And 
there is extensive, ongoing debate about the proper response to “sparse” 
communicative content—whether by “construction” in light of means and 
 
37 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296-97 
(2007) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or 
expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text.”). 




42 See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 19, at 271 (“The phrase ‘freedom of speech’ has 
sparse communicative content, but the legal content of free speech doctrine is very rich.”). 
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methods aimed at something other than discerning communicative content, 
application of “original methods” to resolve ambiguity, deference to political 
branches of government, or application of a presumption of constitutionality 
and concomitant burden of proof.43 
These are some basic tenets of the originalist inquiry into the 
communicative content of the terms of the Constitution. Originalist practice, 
of course, is not always in line with the more careful tenets of the theory. In 
the rest of this Article, we examine three test cases: 
1. of the communicative content of Congress’s power to regulate 
“commerce” under Article I, Section 8, 
2. of the nature of the “public use” element of the Takings Clause, and 
3. the conditions of the requirement in Article II that the President be 
a “natural born citizen.” 
We begin by examining two originalist opinions of Justice Thomas on the 
first two of our three test cases—on commerce and public use. Our aim is to 
highlight some shortcomings of current originalist practice, while 
recognizing, in fairness, that much of the refinement in originalist 
methodology is the product of fairly recent scholarship, and thus could not 
properly be expected of judges lacking the benefit of recent developments 
(much less the familiarity with the tools we advocate).44 
1. Commerce 
Our analysis of the communicative content of the Commerce Clause 
focuses on Justice Thomas’s opinion in United States v. Lopez, as that is the 
opinion that focuses on this question most directly. Justice Thomas concurred 
separately in the Court’s decision in Lopez striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress’s power under Article I, 
Section 8. He did so based on an analysis aimed at “show[ing] how far” the 
court’s precedents had “departed from the original understanding” of this 
provision.45 
 
43 On this last point, see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (1992). 
44 We also note that Justice Thomas’s recent opinions seem to be moving in the direction we 
advocate here. In Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission, Justice Thomas bolstered his conclusion 
that SEC Administrative Law Judges are “Officers of the United States” subject to the 
Appointments Clause by reference to the corpus linguistic analysis of the original meaning of 
“officers” presented in Jen Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 
(2018). See 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056-57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). And in Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice Thomas looked to the Corpus 
of Founding-Era American English for evidence of use of the phrase “expectation(s) of privacy” for 
his analysis of whether “[t]he word ‘search’ was . . . associated with ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’” in the founding era. 
45 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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This formulation seems to cue an inquiry into the original communicative 
content of the text of the Commerce Clause. That also seems confirmed by 
the lead points in Justice Thomas’s analysis—his citation to founding-era 
dictionaries, which he cites as establishing that “‘commerce’ consisted of 
selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”46 
Justice Thomas also seems to recognize the significance of semantic 
context. In footnote 2 of his opinion, Justice Thomas contextualizes the clause 
by emphasizing that the full text does not give Congress the “authority to 
regulate all commerce.”47 Justice Thomas notes that “[e]ven to speak of ‘the 
Commerce Clause’ perhaps obscures the actual scope of that Clause,” given 
that the full text empowers Congress only to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”48 
Justice Thomas supports his conclusions about the original 
communicative content of the Commerce Clause by citing historical sources 
such as “exchanges during the ratification campaign” that show the “relatively 
limited reach of the Commerce Clause and of federal power generally.”49 He 
also cites Hamilton’s writings that congressional control over “the recesses of 
domestic life” and “the private conduct of individuals” would have been “just 
cause for rejecting the Constitution.”50 But in raising Hamilton’s writings in 
this way, Justice Thomas seems to be resorting to evidence of original expected 
applications rather than original communicative content. 
The opinion unambiguously shifts into original expected applications by 
identifying agriculture as a concern that the Founders thought “would remain 
outside the reach of the Federal Government” but that “substantially affected” 
commerce.51 Justice Thomas cites Hamilton as writing that “the supervision of 
agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature” “would be as troublesome 
as it would be nugatory.”52 And this shift occurs without acknowledging the 
difference between original communicative content and original expected 
applications.53 Granted, because he begins with an inquiry into original 
understanding, it is certainly possible to view the applications evidence as mere 
evidence, and not as an indication of an inquiry into pure framers’ intent. 
 
46 Id. at 585–86 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th 
ed. 1773); NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); 
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)). 
47 Id. at 587 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 590. 
50 Id. at 592. 
51 Id. at 590. 
52 Id. at 591 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
53 Id. 
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2. Public Use 
We also focus on Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo v. Town of New London. 
In Kelo, Justice Thomas analyzes the original communicative content of the 
public use proviso in the Takings Clause. Justice Thomas wrote separately to 
criticize the majority’s approach, which required only a “public purpose,” and 
not any “use” of property in the sense of the government actively employing 
the property in some way. 
Justice Thomas says that public use in the Takings Clause, “originally 
understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain 
power.”54 He first focuses on original semantic meaning of the terms in the 
public use provision to illustrate the original communicative content. He 
searches for the original meaning of the operative words by consulting 
founding-era dictionaries and tracing the etymology of the words.55 
The Thomas opinion also invokes the semantic context of the Clause, 
noting that the original meaning of the term use must be narrow because the 
Constitution employs the term narrowly in other contexts. Justice Thomas 
shows that “[e]lsewhere, the Constitution twice employs the word ‘use,’ both 
times in its narrower sense.”56 In this way, Justice Thomas excludes other 
possible contemporary dictionary definitions.57 
Justice Thomas also contextualizes the clause in his attempt to show the 
original communicative content by contrasting the term public use with other 
constitutional terms—general welfare and necessary and proper. Justice Thomas 
writes that “[t]he Framers would have used some such broader term [general 
welfare] if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping 
scope.”58 And he argues that the majority’s “interpretation of the Public Use 
Clause also unnecessarily duplicates a similar inquiry required by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.”59 
Justice Thomas last uses evidence of founding-era practices to show 
original communicative content. He cites Blackstone’s writings, which state 
that private property was held in such high regard that the law “will not 
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the 
whole community.”60 He also shows that early state practices “shed light on 
the original meaning of the same words contained in the Public Use Clause.” 
And he says that states during the founding era used their eminent domain 
 
54 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 508. 
56 Id. at 509. 
57 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (classifying this 
method of constitutional exegesis as intratextualism). 
58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 511. 
60 Id. at 510 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135). 
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power to provide only for “quintessentially public goods, such as public roads, 
toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks.”61 
In citing founding-era writings and referring to early state practices, 
Justice Thomas does not distinguish between original public meaning and 
original intent. In citing the founders’ views on private property, he seems to 
be adhering to an original intent theory—though he could simply be using 
these sources as evidence of how the public would have understood the clause. 
But he also seems to shift to original public meaning when citing early state 
practices, without acknowledging a shift in methodology. 
B. The Measurement of Meaning: Prevailing Tools for Assessing Communicative 
Content 
The scholarship in this field has often skated over the question of our 
methodology for measuring original communicative content. But a few 
scholars have begun to highlight some important issues. 
A pathbreaking piece was Randy Barnett’s study of the original meaning 
of the Commerce Clause. Barnett sought to assess the communicative content 
of commerce by examining every use of that word in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
from 1728 to 1800.62 Barnett did so because he recognized the limitations of 
traditional originalist methods, noting that they make it “difficult to know 
whether the evidence of usage offered by a particular [scholar] was typical or 
cherry-picked.”63 He acknowledged that “the general public [may] have taken 
the word [commerce] in its broader sense notwithstanding how participants 
in the drafting or ratification processes [may] have used the term.” So he 
sought “to conduct comprehensive empirical surveys” of ordinary founding-
era material.64 We view this as an important scholarly development—an early 
recognition of a point we develop below (that the inquiry into original public 
meaning is an empirical one requiring representative data).65 
 
61 Id. at 512. 
62 See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 847, 856-57 (2003) (“Rather than sample these uses, each assistant separately . . . examined 
every appearance of [commerce] to see whether it was being used in its narrower or broader sense.”). 
While Professor Barnett cites historians who claim that the newspaper is representative, that is an 
empirical claim without much linguistic proof. For other, more recent scholarship trying to build on 
Barnett’s methodological breakthrough, see Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United 
States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 468 (2018); James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the 
Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English, 1760–
1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (2018); Lee J. Strang, The Original Meaning of “Religion” in the First 
Amendment: A Test Case of Originalism’s Utilization of Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1683, 1696. 
63 Barnett, supra note 62, at 856. 
64 Id. at 856 & n.30. 
65 See also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011) (observing that the Constitution’s original public meaning “can typically be discovered by 
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Barnett’s Arkansas Law Review piece builds on his earlier work on the 
original meaning of commerce. In a 2001 piece in the University of Chicago Law 
Review, Barnett inquired into whether Justice Thomas was correct in Lopez 
that commerce was “limited to trade or exchange of goods” or whether it could 
“refer to any gainful activity.”66 His study recognized the need to go beyond 
evidence of the founders’ intended meaning. Thus, Barnett sought to 
determine the original communicate content of commerce by conducting a 
systematic linguistic survey of the constitutional record. He surveyed each 
usage of the term commerce in the text of the Constitution itself, contemporary 
dictionaries, the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, ratification 
conventions, and judicial opinions. And he found that in the Constitutional 
Convention, ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers, the “term 
‘commerce’ was consistently used in the narrow sense and that there is no 
surviving example of it being used in either source in any broader sense.”67 
More recently, Larry Solum has noted that the inquiry into original 
communicative content often relies on (1) “prereflective beliefs” of 
contemporary readers “about the meanings of the words and phrases that 
make up the text,” and (2) “dictionaries from the historical periods in which 
the various provisions of the text were authored.”68 To this list we would add 
(3) reliance on examples of English usage in writings from the relevant time 
period—writings that may or may not be a part of the legal “record” involved 
in the ratification of the Constitution, and which are cited to show usage or 
meaning of a particular word or phrase in relevant linguistic context; and (4) 
invocation of the etymology of words in the Constitution. 
Solum helpfully identifies a range of problems with “an intuition-and-
dictionary-based methodology for discovering the meaning of the 
constitutional text.”69 And he proposes a more systematic inquiry comprised 
of three components: (1) corpus linguistic analysis (our subject here); (2) 
“immersion” in “texts from the relevant period” to allow judges of original 
meaning “to ‘train up’ their linguistic intuitions”; and (3) study of the 
“constitutional record,” including “precursor provisions and proposals,” 
drafting history, ratification debates, early historical practice, and early 
judicial decisions.70 We discuss these components in greater detail in Part V. 
 
empirical investigation”); Green, supra note 33, at 44 (implying that one must “survey[] a mass of 
historically-prominent and framing-era material” because “[r]ecovering the historic textually-expressed 
constitutional sense requires the interpreter to put herself as much as possible in the position of 
informed people at the time that language was made part of the Constitution”). 
66 Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112 (2001). 
67 Id. at 104. 
68 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1639. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1655. 
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For now, we simply note the importance of Solum’s contribution to the 
question of the proper methodology. 
A key point made by Solum concerns the relationship between direct 
linguistic inquiries into original communicative content and more traditional 
studies of the constitutional record. Too often we collapse these inquiries into 
one overarching search for “original meaning.” But if we are seeking to 
distinguish communicative content from legal content, or interpretation from 
construction, we should recognize that the study of the constitutional record 
is of secondary (circumstantial) significance. We may use the drafting history 
or ratification debates as evidence of the communicative content of the 
constitutional text.71 But it is mere evidence. And if we are confident that the 
words adopted in the Constitution would have been understood by the public 
in a certain way (if the standard picture is clear), then we could find the 
circumstantial evidence in the drafting history to be overridden by direct 
evidence of original communicative content. 
Courts that have considered these questions have not always appreciated 
these nuances. Again, this is not surprising. But we highlight the inquiries 
into commerce and public use here to set the stage for our proposal for a 
different approach below. 
1. Commerce 
Justice Thomas begins his opinion in Lopez by focusing on tools aimed at 
establishing the original semantic meaning of the words. He cites to 
founding-era dictionaries to establish that “‘commerce’ consisted of selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”72 He also 
cites the etymology of the word— “which literally means ‘with 
merchandise’”—in support of the term’s limited scope.73 
But he quickly shifts to examples of usage from prominent founders such as 
Alexander Hamilton. He notes that the founders often used the term commerce 
“in contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and 
agriculture.”74 Hamilton, for instance, wrote that the “supervision of agriculture 
. . . can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.”75 Justice Thomas uses 
these sources as tools to infer that the original communicative content of the 
 
71 See id. at 21 (“[T]he drafting history can provide evidence of conventional meaning, but this 
role is evidential.”). 
72 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773); NATHAN BAILEY, AN 
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A 
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)). 
73 Id. at 586. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 591 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
2019] Data-Driven Originalism  281 
term commerce could not have been gainful activity generally; otherwise 
Hamilton and others would not have made the distinction between the concepts. 
The Thomas opinion also cites sources that illustrate the founders’ views 
on government generally. He notes that “comments of Hamilton and others 
about federal power reflected the well-known truth that the new Government 
would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the 
Constitution.”76 And if the federal government was to be one of limited 
authority, Thomas concludes that the original communicative content of the 
Commerce Clause could not have been one giving Congress boundless power. 
2. Public Use 
In Kelo, Justice Thomas again begins his inquiry into original 
communicative content by citing founding-era dictionaries. He cites Samuel 
Johnson’s 1773 dictionary as defining use as “[t]he act of employing any thing 
to any purpose.”77 And he notes that when the property is devoted to private 
use, “it strains language to say that the public is ‘employing’ the property.”78 
As in Lopez, Justice Thomas also again turns to etymology. He traces the 
English word use to the Latin word utor, meaning “to use, make use of, avail 
one’s self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc.”79 
The Thomas opinion also tries to infer the original communicative 
content of the words public use from founding-era views on property 
generally. He cites Blackstone’s writings that private property rights are so 
highly regarded that the law “will not authorize the least violation of it.”80 
And he infers from these early sources that the Public Use Clause “embodied 
the Framers’ understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right.”81 
Justice Thomas also uses a survey of early state practices as tool for 
determining the original communicative content of the clause. He 
acknowledges that some early states “tested the limits of their state-law 
eminent domain power.”82 But he notes that most states limited their eminent 
domain for “quintessentially public goods” such as roads, ferries, canals, and 
parks.83 And he says that all other uses of eminent domain were “hotly 
contested.”84 Justice Thomas suggests that these early practices are strong 
evidence of the original public understanding of the clause. 
 
76 Id. at 592. 
77 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (quoting JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 165, at 224 n.4 (1888)). 
80 Id. at 510. 
81 Id. 
82 Id at 513. 
83 Id. at 512–13. 
84 Id. at 513. 
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C. Shortcomings of Existing Methodologies 
The above sets the stage for some observations about shortcomings in our 
existing methods of measuring original communicative content.85 We do so 
with some caveats and with a degree of hesitation. A principal caveat is an 
acknowledgement that the practice of originalism is in a state of refinement. 
Many refinements in originalist methodology have come in recent years, so 
it is unfair to criticize judges who have approached originalist questions 
without the benefit of recent thinking. 
We hope that this project will be an element of that refinement. And it is 
even less fair to charge judges confronting originalist questions in cases 
decided decades ago with the methods we propose here. The judges who 
confronted the questions in Lopez and in Kelo could not possibly have pursued 
the inquiries we propose here—not only because they likely were not aware 
of the linguistic tools we propose, but also because the digitized databases 
that we employ have been created recently. 
For these reasons, we don’t want to be heard as lambasting the originalist 
analysis in the Lopez and Kelo opinions. We think any originalism is better 
than no originalism. And we laud the judges whose work we discuss here,86 
even while proceeding to identify shortcomings in the methods that they have 
employed (and hoping that our criticisms will be seen in the constructive 
spirit in which they are intended). 
With these caveats, we identify here a series of concerns with the common 
course of the originalist inquiry into communicative content, highlighting the 
Lopez and Kelo opinions we have discussed above (and as a preview to our 
further inquiry into the commerce and public use questions presented in those 
cases in Part IV below).87 
 
85 For some related critiques of traditional originalist methodology, see Lee J. Strang, How Big 
Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original 
Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1200 (2017) (“Critics insisted that originalism’s 
reliance on history continued to open it to the Inaccuracy Critique.”). 
86 In full disclosure, this includes present company. One of us is an appellate judge, the other 
his former law clerk. And our own originalist inquiries undoubtedly have fallen short in some of the 
respects enumerated here. So if it sounds like we’re pointing the finger at the Lopez and Kelo 
opinions, we concede that we have other fingers pointing back at ourselves. 
87 We don’t delve here into another originalist methodology—an inquiry into early practice as 
evidence of the original public understanding of the clause. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (declaring that “in interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon 
historical practice” (emphasis omitted)). We see this as more of a behavioral than a linguistic inquiry. 
Perhaps evidence of historical practice could tell us something about communicative content. But 
such evidence would have only indirect—circumstantial—evidentiary significance. 
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1. Problems with Founding-Era Dictionaries 
We (and others) have written elsewhere of the shortcomings of 
dictionaries in any inquiry into the communicative content of words.88 We 
catalog and expand on those shortcomings here. 
a. Insufficient Semantic Context 
A threshold point is that dictionaries often lack the semantic context 
necessary to assess the communicative content of a constitutional phrase. 
Dictionaries typically define individual words, not phrases.89 And because the 
human brain understands words not in isolation but in their broader semantic 
(and pragmatic) context, we may often miss the import of a given constitutional 
term if we just separately look up its component words in the dictionary.90 
The public use question most easily illustrates this point. We can look up 
the word use in a founding-era dictionary, as Justice Thomas did in Kelo. And 
that will tell us something of relevance to the meaning of the phrase public 
use. But that may not be conclusive. The communicative content of public use 
may conceivably be derived by looking up public and use in a dictionary. But 
that use of a dictionary can also be misleading. That’s because the 
communicative content of a phrase isn’t always the sum of its parts.91 This is 
the linguistic problem of “compositionality”: the “meaning of a complex 
expression” is sometimes a “compositional function of the meanings of its 
semantic constituents,”92 and sometimes not—as where “the combination of 
words has a meaning of its own that is not a reliable amalgamation of the 
 
88 See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 
808 (2018) (noting that “[t]he dictionaries typically cited by our courts . . . make no claims about 
the relative frequency of the listed senses of a given word”) ; Phillips & White, supra note 62, at 189 
(“[M]odern dictionaries can usually note what has been ‘linguistically permissible’ at a particular 
time, but not what was likely in a given scenario.”). 
89 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at n.141 (citing OXFORD DICTONARY OF ENGLISH xi 
(3d ed. 2010) (“The general principle on which the senses in the Oxford Dictionary of English are 
organized is that each word . . . has at least one core sense or core meaning . . . .”). 
90 Some dictionaries (even founding-era ones) sometimes give examples of word usage in 
context. But those examples are unlikely to give sufficient semantic context, for a number of reasons. 
First, again, we’re not dealing with phrases, but just words. So the dictionary providing a sentence 
using the word public and another using the word use tells us nothing about how public use is used in 
context. Second, example sentences in founding-era dictionaries, at least, tend to be sentences from 
a much older time period from a famous source or author. This tells us little about contemporary 
usage by “ordinary” folks. Finally, one or two example sentences is too small a sample size to 
generalize to an era’s greater population of language users. 
91 See generally Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys 
in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 692 (2016) (“There is of course more than one way to read 
‘necessary and proper’ and ‘cruel and unusual.’ Each phrase could be read as two requirements. Or 
each phrase could be read as a tautology.” (footnote omitted)). 
92 ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE 83-84 (2011). 
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components at all, e.g. no fear, at all, for good.”93 A related problem is the 
“idiom principle,” or the existence of “semi-preconstructed phrases that 
constitute single choices [in communication], even though they might appear 
analyzable into segments”94—like of course or in fact. We could look up of and 
course in the dictionary, but in doing so we would probably incorrectly 
determine what the idiom of course means. 
Public use could be one of those sorts of phrases. Or it could be a phrase 
with distinct meaning in the dialect of “legalese.”95 If so we could not 
accurately construct the communicative content of public use by looking up 
public and use in a dictionary.96 
The same almost certainly goes for domestic violence. We could look up the 
word domestic and the word violence in a founding-era dictionary, piece 
together the definitions, and come with a very modern sense of domestic 
violence—of an act causing bodily injury to a member of a person’s household. 
But that could be a linguistic mistake (and is, as we show in Part IV.A.) 
b. Polysemy 
A second problem stems from what linguists call polysemy—the existence 
of multiple senses of a given term. This is a common source of indeterminacy 
in our search for communicative content. And when a word is polysemous we 
cannot resolve the question of original communicative content by resort to a 
dictionary—for several reasons. 
The first reason stems from the nature of historical dictionaries.97 The 
most commonly cited founding-era dictionaries are Samuel Johnson’s 1773 
Dictionary of the English Language and Noah Webster’s 1828 publication. And 
these two dictionaries, like many others over history, are a product of 
“piracy.”98 Webster plagiarized from Johnson, and Johnson, in turn, borrowed 
 
93 Alison Wray, Why Are We So Sure We Know What a Word Is?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE WORD 737 (John R. Taylor ed., 2015). 
94 John McH. Sinclair, Collocation: A Progress Report, in LANGUAGE TOPICS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF M. HALLIDAY 320 (Ross Steele & Terry Threadgold eds., 1987). 
95 See infra Section IV.B. 
96 A founding-era legal dictionary could conceivably solve this problem. If public use was a legal 
term of art with a settled meaning in the law at the time of the founding, perhaps we could find 
evidence of that in a founding-era legal dictionary. Yet we have found no evidence of that. The 
founding-era legal dictionaries we consulted do not define public use. See TIMOTHY 
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1783); GILES JACOB, A NEW 
LAW-DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1739). 
97 For further analysis of pros and cons of other founding-era dictionaries, see Gregory E. 
Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning 
of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014). 
98 See SIDNEY I. LAUNDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 43 
(3d ed. 2001) (“The history of English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive and 
often successful acts of piracy.”). 
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extensively from his predecessors.99 This is significant. It means that 
dictionaries of this era can create a false sense of consensus. If we consult a 
couple of founding-era dictionaries and find a single definition of commerce, 
we might be tempted to conclude that that is the accepted sense of the term. 
But it might not be. The commonality might just be the result of plagiarism. 
If Johnson left out an alternative sense of commerce, then Webster is likely to 
have continued the oversight. 
A second, and related, problem is that any single founding-era dictionary 
was generally the work of one or two minds—with the two most influential 
dictionaries of the period (Johnson’s and Webster’s) the epitome of this 
phenomenon.100 Thus, the idiosyncratic nature of dictionaries 
contemporaneous with the Constitution means that these dictionaries may 
reflect more of what the dictionary writer thought than the general 
understanding of the public. While all dictionaries do not “emerge from some 
lexicographical Sinai” and “are the products of human beings,” a dictionary 
written by just one or two people is even more susceptible to the fact that 
“human beings, try as they may, bring their prejudices and biases into the 
dictionaries they make.”101 So it’s unclear how much Johnson’s dictionary 
reflected common usage of the era or just Johnson’s views. 
A third reason founding-era dictionary definitions may not be up to the 
task of telling us the ordinary meaning of the words they define is the 
prescriptive rather than descriptive nature of dictionaries at the time (and up 
until the last half of the twentieth  century).102 Normative (or prescriptive) 
dictionaries “establish what is right in meaning and pronunciation,” providing 
users with what the lexicographer deems the “proper” usage of each word.103 
 
99 See, e.g., ALLEN REDDICK, THE MAKING OF JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, 1746-1773 11 (1996); 
Maggs, supra note 97, at 383 (“Samuel Johnson apparently relied on Bailey’s definitions when he 
prepared his dictionary.”). 
100 See JONATHON GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE 
DICTIONARIES THEY MADE 4 (1997) [hereinafter CHASING THE SUN]: 
Johnson and Webster stand as the ultimate personifications of the solo artistes. Johnson had his 
amanuenses . . . Webster had a single proofreader, enlisted toward the end of the project. But these 
assistants were secondary figures. In neither case did the man whose name adorns the title page 
allow such helpers to influence his end product. 
101 Id. at xiv. 
102 Webster’s Third International Dictionary was the first to break this mold. See also Green, 
supra note 100, at 449-57; HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP 
GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 202–06 (1994); JAMES SLEDD & 
WILMA R. EBBIT, DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 79 (1962) (quoting the editor-in-chief 
of Webster’s Third as stating that “the dictionary’s purpose was to report the language, not to 
prescribe what belonged in it”); ; Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has 
Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 242 
(1999). 
103 Webster’s Way Out Dictionary, Bus. Week, Sept. 16, 1961, at 89, reprinted in DICTIONARIES 
AND THAT DICTIONARY 57 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). 
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Because of this, “the prescriptive school of thought relie[d] heavily on the 
editors of dictionaries to define and publish the proper meaning and usage of 
the terms.”104 On the other hand, “the editors of a descriptive dictionary 
describe how a word is being used and, unlike their prescriptive counterparts, 
do not decide how a word should be used.”105 And “[l]exicographical 
prescriptivism in the United States is exactly as old as the making of 
dictionaries, because of the role played by the dictionary in a society 
characterized by a great deal of linguistic insecurity.”106 Thus, the prescriptive 
nature of founding-era dictionaries makes them less useful for determining 
how people actually used language during that time, just as Strunk and White’s 
Elements of Style is more indicative of how people in the twentieth century were 
encouraged to write than how they actually wrote.107 
Lexicographers also tend to be either lumpers (combining senses) or 
splitters (distinguishing senses).108 Given the difficulties of creating a 
dictionary in the founding era when just one or two shouldered the workload, 
limited resources would tend to push founding-era lexicographers toward 
lumping rather than splitting, entirely missing some senses of words or 
providing definitions that are overly broad. 
Even if we can trust the list of definitions in a dictionary, we are still 
unlikely to find a reliable indicator of communicative content just by looking 
there. Descriptive dictionaries are “museums” of word meanings.109 That is, 
they list the attested senses of listed words. The point of this function is to 
list all known definitions or senses. So if there are alternative senses of a given 
term, a dictionary would list both of them. And it wouldn’t tell you which 
one is the one likely to be understood in a given linguistic context. 
 
104 Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 102, at 242. 
105 Id. 
106 HENRI BÉJOINT, TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN MODERN DICTIONARIES 116 (1994). 
107 Prescriptive dictionaries are not completely irrelevant to understanding language use since 
they could have influenced how people understood and thus used language, but this is a one-step-
removed type of argument rather than directly looking at how people actually used language. 
108 See KORY STAMPER, WORD BY WORD: THE SECRET LIFE OF DICTIONARIES 119 (2017) 
(“Lumpers are definers who tend to write broad definitions that can cover several more minor 
variations on that meaning; splitters are people who tend to write discrete definitions for each of 
those minor variations.”); see also ANNE O’KEEFFE & MICHAEL MCCARTHY, THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 434 (2010) (discussing “lumpers” and “splitters”). 
109 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (referring to dictionaries as “museum[s] of words”); see also 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1375-76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (“Unabridged dictionaries are historical records (as reliable as the judgment and industry of 
the editors) of the meanings with which words have in fact been used by writers of good repute. 
They are often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in an appropriate context, a particular 
meaning is linguistically permissible.”) (emphasis added). 
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When we speak of finding the communicative content of the words of the 
law, we sometimes speak of finding “ordinary” meaning. And ordinary meaning 
seems to implicate an empirical question—the sense of a term that is more 
commonly used or understood.110 Yet dictionaries can’t answer that question. 
That’s because “[t]he dictionaries typically cited by our courts . . . make no 
claims about the relative frequency of the listed senses of a given word.”111 For 
this reason we couldn’t look to the dictionary to determine which of two 
alternative senses of “commerce” is the more ordinary one. We would likely 
find both senses listed, leaving us in the dark about how to interpret that term. 
c. Wrong Timeframe 
A third problem with reliance on the dictionary is a timeframe problem. 
Noah Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language is in a sense not old enough: 
It was published in 1828—almost 40 years after the Constitution was ratified. 
For that reason, Webster’s dictionary may reflect English usage of the wrong 
era; it could be affected by any linguistic drift that occurred in the 40-year 
period after ratification. 
There’s another sense, however, in which Webster’s 1828 dictionary is too 
old: This dictionary, like others of its era, draws upon usage examples from 
much earlier periods—two of the most common being Shakespeare and the 
Bible. To the extent it does so, Webster’s would miss the extensive linguistic 
drift that occurred over centuries leading up to the founding era. 
That problem is more acute, of course, for Samuel Johnson’s dictionary. 
“Johnson’s dictionary reports English usage in Great Britain from a period 
that ended thirty-two years before the drafting of the United States 
Constitution in 1787.”112 (And to the extent Johnson was plagiarizing earlier 
dictionaries or sources, his definitions are even older.) Lest one think that 
thirty-two years before or forty-years after are insufficiently short time 
periods for linguistic drift, below we document how such drift occurred in 
just a decade or two for the term domestic violence.113 
 
110 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 808 (making this point in the context of 
statutory interpretation). 
111 Id. 
112 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1642 . 
113 Even dictionaries published much closer to the writing of the Constitution, such as in the 
late 1780s or early 1790s, may not be from the correct time frame; there is still a problem if they 
plagiarized older dictionaries. And if they are, they would be unlikely to capture linguistic drift. 
Granted, dictionaries, even those published a bit before or after the time period at issue have some 
value in determining original meaning, but they are more of a starting point than an ending point 
in the inquiry. 
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2. The Fallacy of Etymology 
The problem with invoking the etymology of a word or phrase is even 
easier to establish. If our usage and understanding of a word have evolved 
over time, as they often will, the historical pedigree of a word may direct us 
to an outmoded or even obsolete definition.114 Thus, if we are trying to 
recreate the ordinary understanding of a given word or phrase in a given 
language at a particular time, we cannot do so by tracing back the origins of 
the word to another language centuries before. That approach would lead us 
to the conclusion that December is the tenth month of the year, or that an 
anthology is a bouquet of flowers.115 We have no reason to believe that ordinary 
Americans in the late eighteenth century were familiar with the etymology 
of commerce or public use. And for that reason, it makes no sense to seek to 
derive the original communicative content of these English terms in this 
period by turning to their etymological origins in other languages. 
3. Linguistic Intuition and Sample Sentences from Founding-Era 
Literature 
Some of the shortcomings of the dictionary can be addressed by resort to a 
judge’s linguistic intuition—with confirmation by reference to examples of actual 
usage in literature from the founding era. So if we think that domestic violence or 
public use bear meanings not evident in a sum of the definitions of the words in 
these phrases, we can look for examples of the full phrases in founding-era 
literature. And if we find multiple examples of use of these phrases, we can 
perhaps overcome the plagiarism or false-consensus-bias problems noted above. 
We may even be able to amass enough examples to convince ourselves that we 
have derived the common or ordinary sense of a given phrase. 
A twenty-first-century judge’s linguistic intuition may not be a reliable 
measure of communicative content of usage that has now drifted for almost 
two and a half centuries. Judges of our era are much more likely to be affected 
by our sense of contemporary usage, and thus to miss the effects of drift.116 
 
114 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 809–10 (developing this point in critiquing judicial 
reliance on etymology in statutory interpretation). 
115 December, THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 188 (Robert K. 
Barnhart ed., 1995) (“1122, borrowed from Old French decembre, from Latin December, from decem 
TEN, this being originally the tenth month of the early Roman calendar (which began with 
March).”); Anthology, THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 29 (Robert K. 
Barnhart ed., 1995) (“1640, collection of the ‘flowers’ of verse (i.e., small, choice poems) by various 
authors; borrowed, perhaps by influence of French anthologie, from Greek anthologíā flower-gathering 
(ánthos flower + légein gather) . . . .”). 
116 See Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1641-42 (“Because of the 
phenomenon of linguistic drift (or semantic shift), contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a 
reliable guide to the conventional semantic meanings of older provisions of the constitutional text.”) 
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So our intuitions are likely to be affected by our biases “about what the 
constitutional language ‘ought to mean.’”117 “The influence of these beliefs on 
[judicial] intuitions may not be fully transparent;” in other words [judges] 
may have strong beliefs about what the constitutional language ‘ought to 
mean,’ and thus “not recognize the role of their own biases and 
preconceptions.”118 
What about the practice of finding and listing naturally occurring examples 
of language usage—in writings of the framers or even the general public? 
Again, this is commendable in that it lets us home in on the right timeframe 
and consider a full phrase (with more semantic context). But looking at sample 
sentences introduces another set of problems—arising out of the limited nature 
of the dataset, the opaque nature of the method of selecting sample sentences, 
and the risk of confirmation bias or motivated reasoning. If we are looking for 
empirical evidence of common usage or meaning of a particular word or phrase, 
our dataset should be larger and more representative. 
III. CORPUS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS: A BETTER MEANS OF 
MEASURING ORIGINAL COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT 
For all these reasons, we propose the use of a better tool for measuring 
the original communicative content of the Constitution. This tool is one we 
import from a field called corpus linguistics. Here we describe the nature of 
corpus linguistic analysis and identify the corpora (databases) and tools used 
in this field. Then we highlight the features of the corpus we will use to 
analyze the interpretive questions addressed in Part IV. 
A. The Purpose of Corpus Linguistics 
Corpus linguistics is the study of language (linguistics) through 
systematic analysis of data derived from large databases of naturally occurring 
language (corpora, the plural of corpus, a body of language). Corpus linguists 
teach that “the best way to find out about how language works is by analyzing 
real examples of language as it is actually used.”119 To gauge the common 
meaning of a given phrase, a corpus linguist would examine a large number 
of naturally occurring uses of that phrase in a database or corpus of language. 
Corpus linguists engage in “both quantitative and qualitative 
analy[sis].”120 A “key goal of corpus linguistics is to aim for replicability of 
 
117 Id. at 12. 
118 Id. 
119 PAUL BAKER, GLOSSARY OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 65 (2006). 
120 Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-driven Analyses of Language Variation and Use, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 160 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2010). 
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results.”121 The point is to preserve “research findings that have much greater 
generalizability and validity than would otherwise be feasible.”122 Corpus 
linguistic analysis also avoids the Hawthorne Effect—the tendency of people 
to alter their behavior when they know they are being observed.123 It does so 
by examining preexisting, naturally occurring language. 
B. Corpora 
The naturally occurring language studied by corpus linguists appears in 
databases called corpora. Familiar examples of linguistic corpora are databases 
of newspaper articles, books, or legal texts. 
Corpus linguists focus on the development of an appropriate corpus. Size 
matters, as does representativeness. 
A general corpus is aimed at representing a broad speech community, like 
an entire country. A special corpus, on the other hand, would aim at capturing 
the language of a more limited speech community, such as that spoken in a 
region or among those who speak a particular dialect. 
A corpus can either be static or dynamic. A historical corpus is static; it 
captures language usage from a particular time period. A monitor corpus, by 
contrast, is a dynamic one that is continuously updated to track ongoing 
developments in language usage. 
A corpus may bear embedded linguistic metadata. A parsed corpus, for 
example, bears metadata identifying the syntactic characteristics of words. 
Other corpora are merely tagged. A tagged corpus contains metadata on the part 
of speech borne by each work in the corpus, while a raw corpus includes no 
linguistic metadata—just the bare words. 
C. Tools 
Linguists have developed tools and methods for analyzing language usage 
and meaning through systematic searches of such databases. These tools can 
yield linguistic insights that are generally not possible “by human linguistic 
intuition alone.”124 
Corpus linguists analyze frequency data. They can assess how often a 
word is used—either over time or across different genres or registers. And 
 
121 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE at 66 (2011). 
122 Biber,  supra note 120, at 159. 
123 See generally HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED: MANAGEMENT AND 
THE WORKER, ITS CRITICS, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY (1958) 
(critiquing the Hawthorne Experiments). 
124 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 831. 
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that may provide insights into meaning.125 Frequency analysis may also 
extend to different senses of a given word or phrase. By tabulating the relative 
frequencies of different senses of a word or phrase within a corpus, a linguist 
can do what a dictionary can’t—discern the more common sense of a given 
term in a given linguistic context. 
The tabulation of frequency data requires “coding,” or classification of 
search results. In corpus linguistics, coding increasingly draws on principles 
and practices from survey and content analysis methodologies.126 The first 
step is to perform a search in the corpus to identify each instance (or “hit”) 
of the word or phrase in question. In the case of a relatively small number of 
hits (around 100), the coders may analyze each concordance line; where there 
are more hits, the analysis looks at a random sample of results.127 
By looking at “concordance lines” of text from a corpus, a linguist can 
examine a large number of examples of a given term or phrase in naturally 
occurring language. This lets the linguist assemble much more information 
than could be derived from a mere dictionary. And it can yield a broad, 
representative sample instead of a set of isolated—possibly cherry-picked—
sentences. Sense–distribution coding (from concordance-line analysis) is 
arguably the most important use of a corpus; other tools are more exploratory 
than confirmatory in nature (or at best provide only weak evidence of 
meaning). Such coding is also the most qualitative in nature, thus requiring 
the most work. To code the senses of the words and terms we analyzed in this 
paper, we read the approximate equivalent of a Harry Potter novel’s worth of 
context128—in reading at least a paragraph before and after a word or term.129 
Corpus linguists also analyze word meaning or usage by considering a 
word’s common collocates. A collocate is a word-neighbor—a word commonly 
used in association with another. Common collocation of one word or phrase 
with another can tell us something useful about meaning or communicative 
content. This is a linguistic phenomenon that has long been embraced by the 
law. Our law of interpretation has long embraced the noscitur a sociis canon of 
 
125 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 82 
(2d ed. 2001). 
126 See generally James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: 
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus 
Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589. 
127 See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 206-08 (12th ed. 2010) 
(discussing the process of sampling). 
128 We read an estimated 150,000 words of context. The average Harry Potter novel was 154,881 
words. See How Many Words Are There in the Harry Potter Book Series?, WORDCOUNTER (Nov. 23, 
2015), https://wordcounter.net/blog/2015/11/23/10922_how-many-words-harry-potter.html. 
129 We sought to follow the methodology laid out in Phillips & Egbert, supra note 126. To that 
end, we used two coders (one an author and another a research assistant) to code materials separately 
from each other and then compared results. 
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construction (“it is known by its associates”).130 And that is reflected in 
linguistic analysis through collocation—reflected in the idea that “you shall 
know a word by the company it keeps.”131 
Corpus linguistic analysis also “looks at variation in somewhat fixed 
phrases, which are often referred to as lexical bundles.”132 Generally, lexical 
bundles are defined as a repeated series or grouping of three or more words.133 
In other linguistic circles these lexical bundles are referred to as N-grams or 
clusters. Here, we will refer to them as clusters because this is what they are 
referred to in the corpus linguistics software used in this study. (“Do you 
want me to” and “I don’t know what” are two of the most common clusters 
in conversational English.134) Clusters are “not complete phrases” and “are 
statistically defined (identified by their overwhelming co-occurrence).”135 
A corpus search allows an analysis not just at the word level but of multi-
word phrases. It also allows the consideration of syntactic context—by 
examination of the term or phrase in question in a particular syntactic 
structure, as a noun modified by a particular adjective. So instead of turning 
to a dictionary to look up public and use, we can instead look for examples of 
public use because a phrase may mean more than the sum of its parts. 
Moreover, a corpus search can generate data of relevance to the empirical 
question of relative frequency—of how often a given term is used in each of 
two (or more) competing senses. After all, if one sense predominates over 
another, it’s strong evidence that meaning is how that term or phrase was 
most commonly understood at the founding. 
Corpus analysis also brings the advantage of transparency. Most people 
don’t have access to the founding-era dictionaries (though more are being 
placed on Google Books) or to obscure historical sources traditionally relied 
on in originalist scholarship and judicial opinions. But anyone with Internet 
access can pull up an online corpus and run the same searches and analyze the 
same data that was relied on in an article, brief, or opinion. With traditional 
originalist tools, there’s a take-my-word-for-it element. But corpus analysis 
democratizes the inquiry, opening up the data and the conclusions drawn 
from it to everyone. No one has to take the originalist’s word for it. Anyone 
 
130 Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
131 JOHN RUPERT FIRTH, A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955, in  
STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 11 (1957). 
132 GENA R. BENNETT, USING CORPORA IN THE LANGUAGE LEARNING CLASSROOM: 
CORPUS LINGUISTICS FOR TEACHERS 9 (2010). 
133 Id.; see also DOUG BIBER ET AL., LONGMAN GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN 
ENGLISH 990 (1999) (“A lexical bundle is defined here as a recurring sequence of three of more words.”). 
134 BIBER ET AL., supra note 133, at 994. 
135 BENNETT, supra note 132, at 9. 
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can look at the same data and try to replicate or falsify the conclusions. This 
in itself is progress. 
D. COFEA 
If we wish to assess the general public usage of a given term in the late 
eighteenth century, we would need a database that widely represents usage 
across a range of genres—or registers—in the language community of this era. 
And we would need a large enough database that a search will reveal enough 
“hits” to yield representative samples for frequency, collocation, and 
concordance line analysis. 
Until recently, no such corpus existed. The Corpus of Historical American 
English (COHA) came close. But this corpus traced back only to 1810—a 
couple of decades too late for founding-era analysis. COHA also does not 
contain legal materials. 
This shortcoming will soon be remedied. The Corpus of Founding-Era 
American English (COFEA) is currently being developed at the law school at 
Brigham Young University. COFEA will cover the period of 1760–1799—the 
beginning of the reign of King George III until the death of George Washington.136 
COFEA was under construction while we did our analysis, so it wasn’t 
yet publicly available.137 But we have had some involvement in its 
development, and have been able to tap into its core component parts for the 
analysis in this Article. Those parts include the Evans Early Imprint Series, 
the National Archives Founders Papers Online project, and materials from 
Hein Online. Together these corpora comprise a raw, historical corpus. Viewed 
individually, one of them is a general corpus, one is a special corpus (aimed at 
assessing language usage in a specialized sub-community or dialect—legal 
language), and one is a hybrid of the two. 
The Evans Early Imprint Series consists of “nearly two-thirds of all 
books, pamphlets, and broadsides known to have been printed in this country 
between 1640 to 1821.”138 This is a general, historical corpus. Of the nearly 40,000 
titles available in Evans, the University of Michigan’s Text Creation 
Partnership worked in cooperation with the owners of the Evans series “to 
create 6,000 accurately keyed and fully searchable . . . text editions . . . . [that 
are] fully available to the public.”139 The COFEA database that we used for 
this Article includes all the searchable Evans texts that fell within the time 
period of 1760–99. 
 
136 BYU Law & Corpus Linguistics, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu. 
137 COFEA is now publicly available. See https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea. 
138 TEXT CREATION PARTNERSHIP, http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/tcp-evans/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Y6J-48XU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
139 Id. 
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The National Archives’ “Founders Online” database contains the 
“correspondence and other writings of six major shapers of the United States: 
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams (and family), Thomas 
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison.”140 The Founders Online 
collection also contains letters written to these founders by a variety of 
Americans, including both other founders and more ordinary citizens. Again, 
we limited the date range to 1760–1799. The COFEA database that we used 
includes all the Founders Online documents downloaded by the fall of 2015. 
The final component of the COFEA database that we used consists of 
materials from Hein Online. Hein is partnering with BYU by providing materials 
for the creation of COFEA. Our Hein corpus consists of legal materials from 1760–
1799—statutes, case law, legal papers, legislative debates and materials, etc. 
The goal was to assemble a corpus that is both large and representative. Our 
COFEA corpus as now assembled consists of over 100,000 total texts and over 
150 million words. The database is also balanced and representative. It includes 
not just legal materials but the writings of ordinary Americans. Evans is 
indicative of usage among the general public. Hein, on the other hand, gives us 
a window into legal usage. And the Founders Online collection provides 
material not available in the other two databases—letters from both founders 
and others. Together these component databases give us a pretty 
comprehensive picture of language usage at the time of the American founding. 
Because the component databases of our COFEA corpus are different, 
they can provide a window into comparative usage—to gauge whether a given 
term is used one way (or more or less often) in legal materials, and another 
in ordinary writings. This may map onto the various subspecies of originalist 
analysis. The Evans materials can best give us a sense of usage among 
members of the general public. The Founders Online materials, however, may 
be of particular interest to original intent inquiries. And the Hein database 
may be most useful to those interested in how American lawyers of the 
founding era may have understood the language of the Constitution. In other 
words, COFEA will be a helpful tool to all originalists. It can yield sample 
sentences and data of relevance to original public meaning, original intent, or 
original legal meaning.141 
We acknowledge, however, that COFEA is not perfectly representative of our 
target speech community—the American public during the founding era—in at 
least three ways. First, the speech represented in COFEA comes overwhelming 
from white males. That means that both women and nonwhites (principally blacks 
and American Indians) are underrepresented. That could matter if the language 
 
140 Founders Online, National Archives,                                                          
https://founders.archives.gov/ [https://perma.cc/GD48-CDCH] (last visited October 16, 2018). 
141 We recognize that it may not be equally helpful for all those inquiries. 
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usage of founding-era women and nonwhites differed from usage among white 
men. And COFEA cannot answer that empirical question. 
Second, and a related point, COFEA is representative of mostly elite 
voices. Even documents in the Evans materials and letters written by more 
ordinary folk in the Founders’ materials are written by educated people who 
have at least some societal prominence—sufficient to get a book published or 
beg for a job from George Washington. Not everyone could read at the time 
the Constitution was ratified.142 And even those who could did not always 
have their writings preserved. Societal elites were much more likely to have 
their writings saved and digitized than those lower on the social ladder. And 
this is another sense in which COFEA is imperfectly representative (though 
we hasten to add that this is hardly a defect unique to COFEA—this is always 
a problem in dealing with historical documents). 
Third, COFEA doesn’t contain sufficient samples of every genre of 
English-language document at the founding. One current glaring omission is 
newspapers. Although this is less serious than in a modern corpus because of 
the nature of founding-era newspapers—a collection of articles, letters, 
essays, etc., rather than news articles written in a distinctive style—it is still 
an omission. Similarly, COFEA doesn’t currently have the state ratification 
debates—an especially important source for those who look to the ratifiers’ 
understanding for constitutional meaning. 
Thus, COFEA isn’t perfect in its representativeness. But it’s a vast 
improvement over current sources, and the best tool we currently have.143 
There is an additional virtue worth highlighting: the overwhelming majority 
of the documents in COFEA were not created by their authors in an attempt 
to understand the Constitution’s meaning, and the documents were not 
selected for inclusion in COFEA with any constitutional question in mind, 
but were in fact selected by others—the editors of the National Archives’ 
Founders Papers Project, the editors of the Evans Early American Imprint 
Series, and the editors of Hein Online. These are important features (not 
bugs). The materials in COFEA yield a true window into linguistic meaning. 
Materials revealing debates and discussion of the Constitution itself may be 
 
142 At least one scholar has estimated that literacy among white males in New England was 
about ninety percent during the time period of 1787–1795, and about forty-eight percent for white 
New England women during that same time. See KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, LITERACY IN 
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 39 (1979). 
143 We also note that not all the tools of COFEA are fully operative. The underlying metadata, 
for example, is not yet fully entered. For that reason, a year-delimited search is not yet fully available. 
This could be significant, particularly if a word or phrase that is used in the Constitution impacts 
usage patterns in the greater society (in a manner influencing sense distributions). For this reason, 
it seems important to be able to cut off the inquiry at 1787, or at least to be able to compare results 
before and after the Constitution was made public. This function is not a currently available function 
in COFEA; but it should be available in time. 
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helpful to discern original intent. But they can also be misleading if the point 
of the inquiry is the communicative content of the Constitution’s words. 
People engaged in debate, after all, will not always be aiming to convey the 
semantic meaning of the words of a legal document; their goal may be more 
political.144 COFEA, in this sense, is essentially “double-blind”—both the 
creator and the compiler of the documents had no idea that these documents 
would be used to investigate specific constitutional questions. And in that 
sense, it reduces the potential for bias in the originalist inquiry. 
IV. DATA-DRIVEN ANALYSIS 
The previous discussion sets the stage for the need and basis for data-
driven analysis of the communicative content of terms of the Constitution. 
Here we show how that can be done. 
We present replicable, falsifiable data of relevance to the likely 
communicative content of provisions of the Constitution in the late 
eighteenth century. The goal is to respond to the limitations of existing 
methods of assessing original communicative content. We show how corpus 
analysis allows for an assessment of communicative content in light of a wider 
range of semantic context, provides information of relevance to 
disambiguation of polysemy, and can focus on the relevant timeframe. 
We employ the databases in our COFEA corpus to analyze four clauses of the 
Constitution considered above—the Domestic Violence Clause, the Commerce 
Clause, the public use proviso in the Takings Clause, and the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause. And we present corpus linguistic analysis of each of these provisions. 
A. Domestic Violence 
We begin with a relatively clear-cut example—domestic violence. The 
communicative content of this clause has never been litigated. But scholars 
have helpfully identified it as a term that has experienced linguistic drift. 
Today the term is almost always used to refer to “violent or aggressive 
behavior within the home, esp[ecially] violent abuse of a partner.”145 Yet at 
the founding, this phrase apparently carried a different meaning; it was 
understood as a reference to insurrection, rebellion, or rioting within a state 
(in contrast to domestic tranquility in the Preamble). 
That seems uncontroversial. It feels consistent with our linguistic 
intuition (and confirmed by the semantic context of the Domestic Violence 
 
144 Granted, there are a few materials like this in COFEA, but they are pretty rare given 
COFEA’s make-up. 
145 Domestic Violence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/  
[https://perma.cc/4TU8-7HWR] (added March 2006). 
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Clause, which appears in a provision in Article IV that provides not only for 
protection of a state against “domestic Violence” but also “against 
Invasion”146). But can we know that this is correct? We can look up “domestic” 
and “violence” in founding-era dictionaries and come up with an 
understanding that is consistent with our modern construct of the phrase 
“domestic violence.”147 How can we be sure that a guarantee for federal 
protection “against domestic violence” would not have been understood as an 
assurance of protection against assaults on a member of a person’s household? 
Perhaps our intuition tells us otherwise. And we could find isolated examples 
of the full phrase “domestic violence” that might seem to override the dictionary 
definitions of the component parts of the phrase. But how can we trust our intuition 
of a dialect that is so far removed from our current language community? And how 
can we be confident that the sample sentences we find are representative, and not 
cherry-picked (and the product of motivated reasoning)? 
The answer is that we can assemble a data set of the eighteenth-century 
usage of “domestic violence” that is both transparent and falsifiable. And that 
data set can give us an empirical basis for (or disprove) our intuition. 
We performed the relevant analysis and have confirmed the above 
intuition. Our data show that domestic violence today is almost always used in 
reference to an assault on a member of a person’s household, but the term 
was a reference to an insurrection or rebellion in the late eighteenth century. 
To show this, we used both the beta version of COFEA and also the Corpus 
of Historical American English (COHA). And we first assembled some 
frequency data, which show that domestic violence was used infrequently in the 
founding era and for many, many decades after—up to the decade of the 1980s: 
Figure 1: Domestic Violence Frequency in COHA & COFEA 
 
146 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
147 The sense of domestic meaning “[o]f or belonging to the home, house, or household; 
pertaining to one’s place of residence or family affairs; household, home, ‘family’” entered the 
English lexicon by at least the early 1600s. Domestic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, sense 2a (2d 
ed. 1989). And the sense of violence meaning “[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury 
on, or cause damage to, persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or 
usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom” entered the 
English lexicon by the early 1300s. Violence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,  sense 1a. 
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The frequency data does not tell us anything about the meaning of 
domestic violence. It could just mean that a term previously irrelevant suddenly 
became relevant due to changes in society. But the pattern does point towards 
something to investigate further. So to explore why there is such an uptick in 
use of the term, we next turn to collocates. We divide the analysis on the lines 
of the two time periods displayed by the above pattern—the long period of 
consistent but limited usage (1760–1979) and the recent period of much more 
frequent usage (1980–2009). Our collocation analysis showed the following: 
 
 
Table 1: Domestic Violence Collocates 
 
1760-1979  1980-2009  
Collocate Number Collocate Number 
Against 50 Women 30 
State(s) 23 Abuse(d) 13 
Protect* 23 Honor 11 
Convened 17 National 11 
Invasion 13 Victims 11 
Suppress* 11 Killings 9 
Legislature 11 Coalition 9 
Foreign 9 Issues 9 
Congress 9 Violence 8 
Article 8 Domestic 6 
United 6 Cases 6 
President 5 Issue 6 
Insurrection(s) 5 Law 6 
Constitution(al) 5 Ordinary 5 
Application 5 Sexual 5 
Conditions 4 Drug 5 
Aid 4 Services 5 
  Rate 5 
  County 5 
  Support 5 
  Police 5 
  Battered 4 
  Rape 4 
  Statistics 4 
  Shelter 4 
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  Murder 4 
  Race 4 
  Studies 4 
  Project 4 
  Group 4 
* = all tenses of the verb; minimum of 4 results 
 
The difference in collocates of the same term in the two different periods 
is as striking as the frequency usage in the two different periods. For most of 
our history, domestic violence has been associated with states, invasion, various 
forms of the verb suppress, insurrection, and other political actors or terms. 
Yet in the later period, domestic violence has nothing to do with the earlier 
associations, instead being associated with women, abuse, victims, things 
sexual, and rape. This is confirmed by a comparison of the most frequent 
noun (state(s) v. women), verb (protect vs. abuse), and adjective collocate 
(foreign vs. national) from each period. Clearly the collocates of the term, and 
thus its semantic context, has dramatically shifted. This points towards a 
concurrent shift in meaning of domestic violence, but to confirm that we need 
to code the senses of the term. 
The surest way to document linguistic drift is to code for the sense being 
used and see the pattern that emerges over time by reading the term in 
context from a concordance line search. As with the collocates, we compared 
the percentage of the two senses (as well as whether it was some third sense 
or ambiguous) based on the two time periods. And we saw drastic differences 
in frequency of usage: 
 






1760-1979 (n = 77) 1980-2009 (n = 194)
Insurrection sense Family Abuse sense
Other sense Indeterminate
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It’s hard to imagine a starker contrast. We never found a clear use of the 
family abuse sense of the term until the 1980s. And since 1980, the 
insurrection sense—the dominant sense for over two centuries—almost 
completely vanishes, being used once in the early 1980s, and then never 
appearing again in COHA. This wasn’t linguistic drift; it was linguistic 
divorce. The corpus data back up the intuition that the Constitution isn’t 
speaking of family abuse when it uses the term domestic violence. 
B. Commerce 
The Constitution grants power to Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.”148 The word commerce presents a different set of 
challenges than those noted above under domestic violence. Here we can look 
up the operative term in founding-era dictionaries—subject, of course, to all 
the shortcomings catalogued in subsection II.B.1 above. But we face the 
polysemy problem—of competing senses, with no indication of which one to 
attribute to the constitutional context. And without some corpus data we will 
have a difficult time disambiguating the polysemous text. 
Before exploring the data, we describe the various senses discussed in the 
literature that we coded for: 
1. Sense 1: the trading, bartering, buying, and selling of goods (and the 
incidents of transporting those goods within the definition) 
2. Sense 2: the production of goods for trade; manufacturing 
3. Sense 3: any market-based activity having an economic component 
(this would include trade, manufacturing, agriculture, labor, and services) 
4. Sense 4: all forms of social and economic intercourse between 
persons, including, but not limited to, traffic (i.e., trade) 
5. Sense 5: indeterminate 
We also coded for whether there was some other sense of commerce not 
discussed in legal scholarship, but we didn’t find an additional sense. 
One complication here is that these senses are not mutually exclusive. 
While the trade sense and the production sense may be distinct, they both 
could fit within the broad market-based economic-activity sense. And the 
trade sense also fits within the broader intercourse sense. A Venn diagram 
helps illustrate the overlap between the senses.149 
 
 
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
149 While this overlap may appear to complicate the analysis, it can make coding easier. For 
instance, if something is not the trade sense, it cannot be the market-based economic activity or 
social- and economic-intercourse sense either, and so it must be the manufacturing sense. 
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Turning to the data, we first looked at the frequency of the use of commerce 
across the three smaller corpora of COFEA—Evans, Founders, and Hein—
we are using. Again, to standardize the comparison, we use words per million. 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of Commerce by Corpus 
 
While no one that we’re aware of has argued that commerce is a legal term-
of-art, it appears twice as frequently in legal contexts as in ordinary ones. Of 
course, a word can have an ordinary meaning but appear more often in legal 
than ordinary contexts. The word police might be an example of that. To more 
confidently determine whether a word is a legal term-of-art, we would need 
to compare sense distributions across genres of material. If we saw one sense 
















Frequency of commerce by corpus
Evans (ordinary) Founders Legal
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materials, for example, but almost never in ordinary materials, then we could 
conclude that the term has a distinct term-of-art sense in the law. 
Also of note, commerce appears most frequently in the letters of founders, 
which may not be overly surprising given their letters were focused on 
running the military and the government. But since this does not appear to 
be a scenario where we have two competing senses with one being legal and 
one being ordinary, this frequency distribution does not shed much light on 
which sense of commerce is the most common. 
2. Collocates 
We next analyze the top thirty collocates of commerce using COFEA.150 
We do so not because collocate analysis is the best tool for determining the 
meaning of words, but because it can point us in directions to further explore. 
We thus turn to exploratory tools before confirmatory ones, recognizing that 
a very strong finding on an exploratory tool could rise to the level of a weak 
confirmation of meaning. 
 
Table 2: Commerce Collocates 
 
RANK COLLOCATES FREQUENCY MIS151 PERCENT152 ALL153 
1 AMITY 939 7.94 46% 2,032 
2 INTERDICTING 10 7.06 25% 40 
3       FRANCO- 
      AMERICAN 
11 6.99 24% 46 
4 EXEMPTIONS 96 6.95 23% 415 
5 RECAPTURES 13 6.93 23% 57 
6 SPOLIATIONS 138 6.84 21% 643 
7 MANUFAAURES 13 6.83 21% 61 
8 AGRI 25 6.81 21% 119 
9 MANUFADURES 12 6.76 20% 59 
10 VIGATION 12 6.76 20% 59 
 
150 Our collocate search span was six words to the right and left of commerce. We removed 
foreign words from the results. 
151 Mutual Information Score. See Kenneth Ward Church & Patrick Hanks, Word Association 
Norms, Mutual Information, and Lexicography, 16 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 22, 23 (1990) 
(explaining that a mutual information score “compares the probability of observing [word] x and 
[word] y together (the joint probability) with the probabilities of observing [word] x and 
[word] y independently (chance)”). 
152 This is the percent of all the instances a particular collocate occurs in the COFEA that it 
appears nears commerce. 
153 This is the total number of times a particular collocate appeared in COFEA. 
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11 CONCLURE 12 6.67 19% 63 
12 SHACKLE 13 6.65 19% 69 
13 LIAISONS 19 6.54 17% 109 
14 AGRICULTURE 576 6.51 17% 3,375 
15 NAVIGATION 1,457 6.41 16% 9,137 
16 MANUFA 38 6.38 16% 243 
17 AGRICUL 15 6.36 15% 97 
18 ILLICIT 63 6.04 12% 510 
19 DEPREDATIONS 278 6.03 12% 2,275 
20 INTERDICT 10 6 12% 83 
21 NAVIGA 14 5.96 12% 120 
22 SHACKLED 14 5.95 12% 121 
23 RELATIVEMENT 21 5.88 11% 190 
24 VEXATIONS 37 5.85 11% 343 
25 STAGNATION 31 5.84 11% 289 
26 MONOPOLIZE 15 5.83 11% 141 
27 INTERDICTED 15 5.77 10% 146 
28 CONCLU 26 5.76 10% 256 
29 MANUFACTURES 682 5.74 10% 6,816 
30 SPOLIATION 11 5.7 10% 113 
 
A few patterns emerge that shed some, but not a lot, of light on the 
interpretive question at hand. First, the highest-ranked collocate—meaning 
the collocate that appears more often near commerce than near other words—
was amity. (Its raw frequency was also very high.) This is due to the context 
of treaties of Amity and Commerce that the United States entered into with 
various nations. These weren’t treaties to increase the social intercourse 
between nations, nor to increase some kind of joint manufacturing or 
agricultural ventures between countries. They were treaties of trade. 
A few other collocates seem related to the trade sense of commerce. For 
instance, navigation in some form appears four times, and while navigation 
can be related to some of the other senses, it would be to transport goods and 
thus would be for trade. Other collocates that appear to be more related to 
trade than the other senses include Franco-American (likely on the context of 
a trade agreement or alliance), recaptures, shackle(d), liaisons, illicit, 
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depredations,154 and spoliation.155 This is all very soft evidence that the trade 
sense of commerce might be the most common one in the founding era. Taken 
alone, these findings are insufficient to answer the communicative content 
question at hand.156 
3. Clusters (or n-grams) 
Another way to parse the data is to explore clusters (or n-grams). Below 
we report the ten most frequent 3-, 4-, and 5-word clusters where commerce is 
on the far left or far right.157 
Table 3: Commerce N-Gram 
 
Commerce on the left 
(3-word cluster) 
Freq. Commerce on the right 
(3-word cluster) 
Freq. 
commerce, and 1401 treaty of commerce 1187 
commerce of the 1104 of our commerce 653 
commerce and 
navigation 
618 committee of commerce 595 
commerce with the 427 amity and commerce 553 
commerce between the 296 trade and commerce 405 
commerce, which 275 of the commerce 375 
commerce. The 262 on our commerce 314 





243 treaties of commerce 277 
 
154 ”The act of making a prey of; plundering, pillaging, ravaging; . . . an act of spoliation and 
robbery.” Depredation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE. 
155 ”The act of spoliating, despoiling, pillaging, or plundering; seizure of goods or property by 
violent means; depredation, robbery.” Spoliation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE. 
156 Another way to do collocate analysis, besides the word of interest, is to compare the 
collocate patterns to potential synonyms, such as trade and manufacturing (and variations of the 
term). We found that trade shares six top-thirty collocates with commerce, often similarly ranked: 
illicit (4th); interdicting (5th); exemptions (10th); monopolize (11th); naviga (27th); and stagnation (29th). 
On the other hand, manufacturing shares just two—agri (7th) and agriculture (14th)—and further 
exploration shows they are actually just evidence that the three often appear together in a list. Thus, 
the fact that commerce and trade have more overlap in collocate networks than commerce and 
manufacturing do is evidence that the trade sense is likely more common than the manufacturing 
sense. 
157 The corpus software we used counted punctuation as a word. 
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commerce; and 190 amity, commerce 253 
Commerce on the left 
(4-word cluster) 
 Commerce on the right 
(4-word cluster) 
 





244 a treaty of commerce 553 
commerce, and 
navigation 
174 of amity and commerce 534 
commerce, and the 173 the treaty of commerce 323 
commerce and 
navigation,  
167 of amity, commerce 248 
commerce with Great 
Britain 





107 of trade and commerce 95 
commerce between the 
two 
106 depredations on our 
commerce 
85 
commerce with foreign 
nations 
106 of navigation and 
commerce 
80 
commerce, and to 105 no treaty of commerce 74 
Commerce on the left 
(5-word cluster) 
 Commerce on the right 
(5-word cluster) 
 
commerce of the United 
States 





127 treaty of amity, 
commerce 
236 
commerce between the 
United States 
87 to the committee of 
commerce 
206 
commerce with the 
United States 
78 of the treaty of 
commerce 
141 
commerce between the 
two countries 
67 for the protection of 
commerce 
121 
commerce with foreign 
nations, 





64 of a treaty of commerce 70 
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commerce with Great 
Britain, 
61 make a treaty of 
commerce 
70 
commerce with the 
defence of 









A few interesting patterns emerge. First, some of the most common words 
that follow commerce in these clusters when it is on the left are with and 
between, and they are often followed by some proper noun representing a 
polity. These two words would fit with a sense of trade or intercourse, but not 
manufacturing or all economic activity that would include things like 
agriculture or labor. 
Second, a few clusters point towards areas of additional research: treaties of 
commerce, committees of commerce, and protection of commerce. What did 
these treaties cover? What did these committees do vis-à-vis commerce? How 
was commerce protected? The answers to these questions will shed further light 
on what commerce meant during the time period. Relatedly, and as noted 
above, the idea of a treaty with another country over agriculture, domestic labor, 
or manufacturing seems odd. A treaty over trade, however, does not. 
Third, certain three-word patterns emerge, such as commerce and 
navigation, or amity and commerce. Sometimes such word patterns are not 
interchangeable in their order, which can indicate a specialized meaning. In 
linguistics, these types of phrases or groupings of words are often referred to 
as binomials or multinomials. A binomial is “a coordinated pair of linguistics 
units of the same word class which show some semantic relation,” and is often, 
but not limited to, a noun pair.158 An example of this from legal language 
would be cease and desist or aid and abet, which are sometimes called legal 
doublets.159 “Multinomials are similarly chained by semantic and syntactic 
links, but consist of longer sequences of related words.”160 Examples include 
hold, defend, and favor or lock, stock, and barrel.161 Binomials have been found 
to be characteristic of legal language and have been observed to be five times 
more frequent in modern legal writing than nonlegal writing, making 
 
158 Joanna Kopaczyk & Hans Sauer, Defining and Exploring Binomials, in BINOMIALS IN THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH: FIXED AND FLEXIBLE 1, 3 (Joanna Kopaczyk & Hans Sauer eds., 2017). 
159 See BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON STYLE 192-94 (2d ed. 2006) 
(explaining that “[t]he doublet and triplet phrasing common in Middle English still survives in legal 
writing, especially contracts, wills, and trusts,” including the phrases “aid and abet” and “cease and desist”). 
160 Anu Lehto, Binomials and Multinomials in Early Modern Parliamentary Acts, in BINOMIALS, 
supra note 158, at 262. 
161 Kopaczyk & Sauer, supra note 158, at 3. 
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binomial usage “clearly a style marker in law language.”162 Examples of 
multinomials in legal language include give, devise and bequeath or right, title, 
and interest. This frequent occurrence of binomials and multinomials in legal 
writing is because of their ability to “increase the precision and all-
inclusiveness of the documents, although they are also used for stylistic 
reasons and belong among the key features of the genre.”163 If the clusters 
found in this paper are binomials and multinomials, then it is likely that at 
the time they were used they had become or were in the process of becoming 
technical or legal terms of art.164 
Finally, we noted some larger multinomials of interest. For instance, the 
multinomial amity, commerce, and navigation occurred 153 times, no doubt in 
the context of treaties. Substituting in trade for commerce makes sense in that 
multinomial, but substituting synonyms for other senses makes less sense, 
particularly in a treaty context: 
1. amity, manufacturing, and navigation (not implausible, but amity and 
navigation seem to have less to do with manufacturing than trade); 
 
162 Marita Gustafsson, The Syntactic Features of Binomial Expressions in Legal English, 4 TEXT- 
INTERDISC. J. FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE 123, 125 (1984). 
163 Lehto, supra note 160, at 261; see also VIJAY KUMAR BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE 
USE IN PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS 108 (1993) (explaining that “[e]xpressions like these . . . [are] an 
extremely effective linguistic device to make the legal document precise as well as all inclusive.”). 
       164 We thus investigated the most frequent clusters that appeared as though they might be 
binomials, examining them in reverse order as well. As the table below shows, ordering usually matters. 
 
Table 4: Clusters 
 
Selected Clusters Freq 
amity and commerce 553 
commerce and amity 7 
agriculture and commerce 81 
commerce and agriculture 54 
manufactures/ing and commerce 90 
commerce and manufactures/ing 250 
navigation and commerce 277 
commerce and navigation 618 
trade and commerce 405 
commerce and trade 24 
 
While agriculture and commerce are used somewhat interchangeably when in a binomial or 
doublet, they do not occur relatively equally regardless of order. For example, trade and commerce 
appears nearly 17 times more often than commerce and trade. And amity and commerce appear a 
staggering 79 times more often than commerce and amity. This may mean that some of these doublets 
have begun to take on a meaning that is more than the sum of their semantic parts. Both collocate 
and concordance line analysis of these binomials could help show if this is the case. 
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2 amity, agriculture/manufacturing/domestic labor, and navigation (again 
possible, but not as good of a fit given the items substituted for commerce seem 
less relevant to the other two items on the list); 
3. amity, all social and economic intercourse, and navigation (the social 
intercourse aspect seems out of place with navigation). 
 
And the multinomial agriculture, commerce, and ___ occurred 49 times in 
COFEA, with the following terms making up that last word: 
 
Table 5: Multinomials  
 
agriculture, commerce, and ___ Freq 
manufactures 31 




domestic economy 1 





political relations 1 
 
 
The fact that about two-thirds of the time this multinomial occurs as 
agriculture, commerce, and manufactures would point towards a trade sense of 
commerce: the manufacturing sense would be redundant; an all market-based 
economic activity would also be redundant because it would already include 
agriculture and manufacturing; and all social and economic intercourse seems 
too broad as the social-intercourse aspect would be out of place in a list with 
agriculture and manufacturing. Also, the fact that no word found in that final 
slot was synonymous with trade further bolsters a trade-sense of commerce in 
that multinomial. 
4. Sense Differentiation 
The last point of our analysis of commerce is our coding of the senses we 
found sampling concordance lines. This is the meat-and-potatoes of 
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determining meaning from corpus analysis—the previous tools (pure 
frequency data, collocates, and clusters) pale in comparison in the insight they 
add (if any) to the inquiry into communicative content. In other words, we 
saved the most important tool for last. Below are our results.165 
 
Figure 5: Commerce Sense Distribution  
 
The results here are consistent with the analysis we’ve seen from the 
collocates and clusters: the trade-sense of commerce appears to be the 
dominant sense. This is especially so in the Legal (Hein) and Founders 
corpora, where the other senses are nonexistent or hardly appear in our 
random sample. As might be expected, in more ordinary contexts (the Evans 
Corpus), the trade sense appears slightly less often than the context being 
indeterminate,166 and the other senses occur the most, though still much less 
than the trade sense. 
 
165 The word commerce appeared in the three smaller corpora as follows: Evans (5330), Founders 
(10,071), and Hein (9,600). We then randomly sampled 125 instances from each of these three smaller 
corpora, sampling based on document rather than instance of commerce. We used two coders, making 
sure they had at least seventy percent agreement on practice materials before coding the random 
sample. For more on coding methodology, see generally Phillips & Egbert, supra note 126. 
166 A search result was coded indeterminate if, after reading the surrounding context (usually 
at least reading the equivalent of a paragraph before and after the word), one of three things 
occurred: (1) there was not enough information to code a sense; (2) we couldn’t tell between two or 
more competing senses; (3) we leaned towards one sense, but were not confident enough to say that 
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We also combined the results that were indeterminate but leaning towards 
a sense with those coded as a particular sense to see how that might change 
the sense distribution. 
 
Figure 6: Commerce Sense Distribution by Corpus with “Leaners” 
 
Adding the instances where we leaned towards a sense to instances where 
we were more confident that was the particular sense shows even stronger 
evidence that the trade sense is the most common sense across corpus genres. 
And it makes sense that the Evans results would look different than the other 
two corpora. While the Founders materials are not legal in nature—they’re 
mostly letters—they were on topics that had a much higher overlap with the 
Legal Corpus (running a country and the military) than the Evans Corpus. 
This suggests that the genre alone may not make a difference, but that the 
substance of the genre also matters. 
Thus, the trade sense of commerce seems confirmed by collocation 
patterns, cluster patterns, and sense distribution. This triangulation of all the 
tools of the corpus pointing, some more strongly than others, at the same 
meaning increases our confidence in the results. Of course, further research 
could be done. One could look at the sense distribution just in the narrow 
context of when some version of the phrase “regulate commerce” occurs. The 
value of a corpus is the ability to slice and dice context to get to the most 
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C. Public Use 
We next turn to the term public use as found in the Constitution’s Takings 
Clause. The relevant constitutional language states: “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”167 As illustrated 
in the Kelo decision, and discussed above, there are several traditional tools 
we could use to discern the meaning of the term. Our linguistic intuition 
might indicate that public use means something the public actually gets to use. 
Yet individual intuition is based on the corpus of English we have in our head, 
a corpus that is highly idiosyncratic and highly modern. We could turn to 
founding era dictionaries, but we will then have to deal with all the problems 
we’ve highlighted above, including perhaps the biggest one in this context: 
the term doesn’t appear and must be constructed from its constituent parts—
public and use. Finally, we could rely on a handful of examples of usage of the 
term from founding-era sources, such as the Federalist Papers. But that would 
only give us a likely unrepresentative sample too small in size to generalize 
from to American English usage at the time. So we could get an answer, but 
not one we could have any confidence was actually correct. 
1. Frequency 
The first mode of analysis in peeling back the communicative content of 
public use in more rigorous fashion is to compare the frequency of occurrence 
of this term across the three smaller corpora that make up COFEA.168 A term 
that occurs much more frequently in the Evans Corpus, with its more 
ordinary genre of documents from (at least some) more ordinary users of 
English, than in the Legal Corpus (Hein) would perhaps indicate a term that 
has an ordinary meaning. And the reverse might indicate a term that has a 
legal meaning, or at least a meaning that is more common in a legal context 
(though sense distribution is what more confidently answers this question). 
To standardize the comparison since the three corpora are not identical in 
size, we report the frequency per million words: 
 
167 U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
168 Due to nonstandardized spelling in the Founding era, we used the following search: public* 
use*. This picked up alternate spellings, such as publick, as well as the plural form of use. 
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Figure 7: Frequency of Public Use by Corpus  
 
Public use occurs six times more frequently in legal language than ordinary 
language, and three-and-a-half times more frequently in Founders’ letters 
than in other types of ordinary documents authored by, on average, less elite 
folks. This is evidence that the term either has a legal meaning, or at least has 
more relevance to a legal context compared to an ordinary one. But we can’t 
tell which is the explanation because these results suffer from observational 
equivalence—the phenomenon in which two things that are distinct appear 
outwardly to be the same. Only widely disparate sense distributions across 
materials (ordinary v. legal) will provide evidence of a legal term-of-art. 
2. Sense Differentiation 
While we did collocate and cluster (n-gram) analysis on public use, the 
results did not shed any light on which sense was most common at the 
founding. This is not surprising since both of those tools tend to be more 
exploratory than confirmatory in nature. So we next turn to the most 
important type of corpus analysis: the hard work of qualitatively analyzing 
concordance lines. And for legal questions, this type of analysis seems the 
most relevant and most likely to provide useful data. 
Based on Justice Thomas’s discussion in Kelo of the potential meanings of 
public use at the Founding, we used the following categories: 
1. Sense 1: government, military, or public owns or directly employs for 
a purpose 
2. Sense 2: increases the convenience of or helps in some way the 
government or public, including indirect benefits; i.e., broad public purpose 
3. Sense 3: some other meaning 
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We were not just coding for the senses discussed in Kelo, since that 
discussion may not have completely or accurately captured founding-era 
senses; instead we left the door open to other possible meanings of the term 
not discussed. And, in fact, we found one: a sense that appears to mean 
“making known to the public” or “or obtaining some kind of public 
advantage,” and was used in the context of information or documents of some 
kind.169 This is not a sense one could necessarily construct from dictionary 
definitions, nor that anyone was discussing. So we were not just using the 
corpus data to falsify others’ theories of meanings, but also to look for 
meaning. 
Below we report the sense distribution we found in the sampled material. 
We present the material both centered around the results in each corpus as 
well as centered around each sense.170 
Figure 8: Distribution of Senses of Public Use by Sense 
 
169 An example is in the Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (May 19, 1788): 
“The language of the Antifederalists is, that if all the other states adopt, New York 
ought still to hold out. I have the most direct intelligence, but in a manner which 
forbids a public use being made of it, that Clinton has, in several conversations, 
declared his opinion of the inutility of the UNION.” 
in 9 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 430, 431 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 2nd ed. 
1904) (1886). This sense of public use may have some similarities to a sense of the term found in 
patent-law doctrine. See The Act July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. But the usages we found had 
nothing to do with patents or inventions. 
170 We searched for the following terms: public use, public uses, publick use, and publick uses. We 
found the following totals for each of the smaller corpora: Evans (86), Founders (237), and Hein 
(460). We coded all but 3 of the results from Evans (one was a typo and so not public use and the 
other two quoted the Constitution). We randomly sampled 125 from Founders and Hein, coding all 
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The direct sense that Justice Thomas argued for is much more common 
than the broader, indirect sense that the Kelo majority adopted. Depending 
on the corpus, the direct sense is 5.3 times (Evans), 53 times (Founders), or 
infinitely (Legal) more common than the indirect, broad sense. In fact, a third 
sense—”making information public; gaining public advantage through 
revealing something”—was more common than the indirect sense. 
These findings come with the caveat that we coded almost as many hits as 
indeterminate as we coded as direct. And any inquiry into the communicative 
content of public use would therefore require us to decide what to make of all 
the ambiguity. It is theoretically possible that all the hits we coded as 
indeterminate could have been an example of the indirect sense of the term, 
making the distribution of the two senses about equal. That’s why we also 
coded the sense we were leaning towards when we thought the usage was 
indeterminate (more on that below). 
Figure 9: Distribution of Senses of Public Use by Corpus 
 
 
The distributions of senses across the various corpora also highlights a 
point we noted above: the direct sense predominates even more in a legal 
context than in more ordinary ones, though the other two senses are still not 
common in ordinary contexts. Again, however, the high level of 
indeterminacy clouds these results. Below we combine the instances where 
we were confident enough to assign a sense with the instances where we 
leaned towards a sense, but thought the use was sufficiently indeterminate 
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Figure 10: Distribution of Public Use Senses by Corpus With “Leaners” 
 
When we leaned toward a sense in an indeterminate context, we leaned 
overwhelmingly toward the first sense. By treating those results we coded as 
indeterminate but leaning towards a sense as having coded the result as the sense, 
the likelihood of public use being used in the direct compared to the indirect sense 
ranges from 5.7 times (Evans), to 29.3 times (Founders), to 97.8 times (Legal) more 
likely. We don’t necessarily take a position on where the line is to determine that a 
particular sense is the operative one.171 One could imagine the line-drawing could 
be just if the differences between the percentages of the coded sense are larger than 
the margin of error, and therefore are statistically significant. Or one could imagine 
a higher standard where the percentage of a particular sense must reach a certain 
threshold (or the ratio between one sense and the next highest sense as to be a 
certain minimum value). The data here would likely be clear under any standard. 
For reasons noted above it is unclear whether the direct sense of public use 
is a legal term-of-art. (The fact that the direct sense is the predominate sense 
in ordinary texts as well probably reduces the odds it’s a legal term.) But given 
that the Constitution is a legal text, the fact that in the legal materials of 
COFEA (as well as the Founders’ letters) the direct sense is even more 
common than the indirect sense compared to ordinary materials is further 
evidence as to what the Constitution’s communicative content is for the term 
public use. Thus, while perhaps we can only speak of probabilities here, the 
evidence is strong that Justice Thomas was correct: when the Constitution 
uses the term public use it means the government, military, or public owns or 
 
171 It could be possible to import standards of proof from criminal or civil contexts, though 
scholars and courts would still need to figure out numbers for what is beyond a reasonable doubt or 
a preponderance of the evidence, for example. This would be somewhat arbitrary, though the .05 
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directly employs the item for a purpose, rather than the indirect-, broad-
benefit sense the Kelo majority proposed. 
D. Natural Born 
Except for those who were already “a Citizen of the United States at the time 
of the Adoption of th[e] Constitution,” only a person who is “a natural born 
Citizen” of the United States “shall be eligible to the Office of President.”172 Here 
we run into the same dilemmas we faced with domestic violence and public use if we 
rely on traditional originalist tools: we’re stuck with looking up two different words 
in problematic founding-era dictionaries, relying on a few examples of the term in 
context, or checking our modern, idiosyncratic linguistic gut. And it’s not clear what 
the latter would tell us—perhaps that the term refers to those not born via C-
section? Again, without a properly designed corpus with its tools, the confidence 
we’ll have in the answer to what that term meant in the Constitution in the 
founding era will be quite limited. 
Below we report the frequency of natural born across corpora, which may shed 
light on whether the term is an ordinary one, a legal one, or perhaps has some other 
specialized meaning (though frequency data cannot fully answer the question). 
 
Figure 11: Natural Born Frequency Per Million Words by Corpus 
  
 The results are not surprising given the types of definitions we note 
below: natural born is more common in legal contexts than in more ordinary 
ones, 2.75–2.87 times more frequent. If there were both a legal and nonlegal 
sense of natural born, this would lead us to believe that the odds of the legal 
sense being the operative one in the Constitution are increased by these 
findings; but that can only be confirmed by analyzing the sense distribution. 
 
























2019] Data-Driven Originalism  317 
Yet here all the senses seem to be legal. Based on scholarship in the area,173 
we created the following sense categories for natural born: 
1. Sense 1: someone born in sovereign territory, no matter the status of 
their parents (including those born outside of sovereign territory to 
diplomats) 
2. Sense 2: someone born outside of sovereign territory to a natural 
born father174 
3. Sense 3: someone whose natural born status is bestowed by legislative 
act 
4. Category 4: indeterminate 
 
We also coded for the possibility that natural born was being used in some 
other sense but found no such examples. All these senses appear to be legal 
in nature—there does not appear to be an ordinary sense of the term. Thus, 
to try to answer the question of which legal sense is the operative one, we 
turn to the sense distribution from concordance line analysis.175 




173 See generally Thomas H. Lee, Natural Born Citizen, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (2017); Mary 
Brigid McManamon, The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. U.L. REV. 
317 (2015); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 73 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born”, 20 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 199 (2017). 
174 This sometimes included a grandfather or just parents generically. 
175 Collocate and cluster (n-gram) analysis did not yield results that helped answer which sense 
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The percentage of the time the use of natural born was too indeterminate 
to confidently code as a particular sense is extremely high. This severely 
undermines the ability to draw much, if any, of a conclusion from the data.176 
 
Figure 13: Natural Born Sense by Corpus 
 
When looking at the results based on the corpus, interestingly, even 
though the three senses of natural born all seem to be legal ones, the lowest 
indeterminacy occurs in corpus with the most ordinary materials and authors. 
Perhaps that’s because the most common legal sense of natural born was 
sufficiently known in ordinary contexts, but the lesser known legal senses had 
not seeped in as much into ordinary Founding-era American English. 
We next report the results when the leaning senses, noted when we 
primarily think the use of natural born is indeterminate, are included with 
instances where we didn’t think it was indeterminate (or at least sufficiently 
so to code it as such). Sometimes, with leaners, it was clear it was not the 
legislative-bestowal sense, but we could not tell whether the likely sense was 




176 We found the following totals from each smaller corpus: Evans (52), Founders (41), and Hein 
(130). We coded all but four of the Evans results, one of the Founders results, and fourteen of the 
Hein results because those excluded instances were either quoting the Constitution or not readable. 
22.9%
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Figure 14: Natural Born Sense Distribution by Corpus with Leaners 
 
The addition of the leaners paints a picture that is still high in 
indeterminacy. But the location-based sense of natural born—one gets natural-
born status by where they are born rather than who they are born to (with the 
exception of the children of ambassadors born abroad)—appears to be the 
most common sense when indeterminacy is ignored. Again, this greater 
frequency of the location-based sense is more prominent in more ordinary 
contexts—Evans and even the Founders Corpus—and less so in the legal 
context. It’s unclear what this means. Perhaps an ordinary American at the 
Founding would have been more likely to understand natural born in the 
location-based sense, whereas an American lawyer from that same period 
would have seen the meaning as less clear, or at least would have taken a more 
nuanced view of the meaning of the clause. Natural born is a good example of 
the limits of corpus analysis. Sometimes it does not yield clear answers. That 
can be a function of the data, the ability of the tools to actually answer the 
question, or both. Here, given the high percentage of indeterminate results, 
we are not confident declaring the most likely communicative content of 
natural born in the Constitution. Other originalist methods need to be 
brought to bear on this question. 
V. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAVEATS 
We have no hesitation in advocating the use of corpus linguistic analysis 
as a central element of the first stage of any inquiry into the original 
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to some degree. And data-driven originalism—of some form and to some 
degree—is an essential response. 
That said, the application of this linguistic tool is in its infancy. Numerous 
questions remain as to how and when to implement this data-driven inquiry. 
In the paragraphs below, we first highlight the unique contributions that 
flow from corpus linguistic analysis of original meaning. Then we 
acknowledge some caveats—limitations inherent in this tool as applied to 
originalist questions—and begin the task of mapping out possible responses 
to the caveats as we see them. 
A. Contributions 
We see three unique contributions stemming from the use of corpus 
linguistic analysis of the original communicative content of the Constitution. 
Corpus analysis (1) addresses shortcomings of traditional methods of inquiry 
into communicative content (dictionaries and small, nonrandom samples of 
usage); (2) sharpens the debate over when and how to resolve ambiguity in 
original meaning; and (3) facilitates the (up to now mostly unexplored) 
debate over whether and to what extent the Constitution is written in 
ordinary English or in the distinct dialect of the law. 
1. Corpus Analysis Addresses Shortcomings of Traditional Inquiries 
Traditional tools for measuring original communicative content fall short 
in the various respects highlighted above. Dictionaries do not consider 
sufficient semantic context, cannot tell us which of the various senses of a 
given term is more ordinary, and are usually not calibrated to the relevant 
timeframe. And the use of linguistic intuition—as confirmed by a handful of 
sample sentences from founding-era documents—may be the product of 
motivated reasoning and cherry-picking and is not transparent or falsifiable. 
A principal contribution of corpus linguistic analysis is its ability to 
overcome these deficiencies. The point is most easily made by reference to 
the domestic violence example. As noted above, we can now point to data that 
show that the phrase domestic violence was used almost exclusively to refer to 
an insurrection or rebellion, and never as a reference to household assault. 
We can present that data in a systematic, transparent way that provides some 
assurance that we are not cherry-picking isolated examples in a motivated 
attempt to get at a preferred outcome.177 And, importantly, we can preserve 
 
177 See also Strang, supra note 85, at 1213 (arguing that one of the biggest pay-offs to originalists 
using corpus linguistics is that it allows for a culture of scholarship where the participants make 
claims that other scholars can review and then affirm or rebut). 
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our dataset (and methodology of assembling it) in a manner that invites 
replication and falsification by anyone wishing to question our analysis. 
These features have never been available using traditional originalist 
methods. Existing methods either suffer from the many shortcomings of the 
dictionary or open themselves up to concerns of motivated reasoning or 
cherry-picking. Corpus linguistic analysis is an essential step in overcoming 
these problems. It sharpens the debate at the threshold inquiry into the 
“standard picture” for interpretation. It thereby establishes common ground 
for discussion on the basis of transparent data that is subject to falsification. 
This is an important move. It is an significant improvement over a world in 
which each side picks its preferred dictionary definitions or sample sentences 
and then insists it has the better of the argument. 
2. Corpus Analysis Sharpens the Debate Over When and How to Resolve 
Ambiguity in Original Meaning. 
Corpus linguistics can also help sharpen points of debate among 
subtheories of originalism. One key point of disagreement in this field is over 
how to deal with the problem of ambiguity (or vagueness or other forms of 
underdeterminacy). Some originalists posit the existence of a “construction 
zone” that opens up upon a determination of ambiguity—a zone that no 
longer is dependent on the inquiry into original communicative content, but 
that instead can take account of any of a range of policy grounds for 
establishing rules or standards of constitutional law.178 Others propose to 
close the gap of ambiguity in other ways—by resort to “original methods” of 
interpretation179 or by application of a presumption of constitutionality (or in 
other words a heavy burden of proof for claims of unconstitutionality).180 
 
178 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 65, at 72 (“If construction is inevitable because the information 
contained in the text runs out before we have enough information [sic] resolve a case or controversy, 
then originalists need to debate not only the appropriate approach to constitutional interpretation 
but also the appropriate approach to construction. Some may wish to avoid this normative 
discussion, but cases still need to be decided.”). 
179 See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 751 (“Under [the original methods] 
approach, the Constitution should be interpreted using the interpretative methods that the 
constitutional enactors would have deemed applicable to it.”). 
180 See SEGALL, supra note 12, at 235 (noting that “some of the Original Originalists such as 
Raoul Berger and Lino Graglia” advocated for a standard of judicial review “where judges do not 
invalidate state or federal laws absent clear proof that such laws contradict clear text or almost 
universally accepted understandings of what the language means”); see also Michael D. Ramsey, 
Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2017) 
(observing that when constitutional text would not yield answers, Justice Scalia would turn to other 
methodologies, including “structural reasoning and background assumptions,” “English law 
background,” and “post-ratification practice”). 
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This debate has often skated over an important threshold question—of 
the nature and extent of the ambiguity necessary to trigger the need for a 
closure rule. Proponents of construction posit that “textual 
indeterminacies”181 leave room for judges (or other governmental actors) to 
step in and build out the “skyscraper” of constitutional law on top of the 
“framework” dictated by its clear original meaning.182 And critics of 
construction dispute the basis or need for construction, insisting that the 
better means for closing the gap is through original methods of 
interpretation, or a presumption of constitutionality. 
Yet all participants in this debate beg the question of the nature and extent 
of the ambiguity necessary to trigger the need for a closure rule. Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport helpfully acknowledge the theoretical difficulty. They 
note that there is a key ambiguity “about what constitutes [the sort of] 
ambiguity” necessary to open up the door to construction (or to other means of 
closing the gap).183 Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport helpfully ask whether the 
originalist inquiry calls for a closure rule whenever there are two plausible 
original meanings but there is “stronger evidence for one over the other,” or only 
when each of those two meanings “are absolutely in equipoise.”184 And they 
plausibly assert that the latter sort of ambiguity seems “very unlikely” while the 
former is not really an ambiguity, but a case in which the party advocating the 
view with “stronger evidence” should prevail as an original matter.185 
Yet no one, to date, has ventured any further into this thicket. Perhaps for 
good reason: We have never had the means of measuring the extent of the 
ambiguity of the communicative content of a particular provision of the 
Constitution; the degree of ambiguity has always been a theoretical construct 
(as with the McGinnis and Rappaport assertion that “equipoise” is “very 
unlikely”). That’s no longer always the case. For at least some questions of 
original meaning, we can assemble and analyze data on the degree of 
ambiguity of the communicative content of the Constitution. And the data 
can facilitate a more reasoned debate about the propriety and basis for the 
application of a closure rule. 
This point can be amplified by reference to the commerce question. As 
with domestic violence, the corpus data on commerce give us a window into 
 
181 See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–9 (1999) (describing a process whereby the political process 
fills in “textual indeterminacies”). 
182 See Balkin, supra note 10, at 560 (“Framework originalism leaves space for future 
generations to build out and construct the Constitution-in-practice.”). 
183 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 773. 
184 Id. (raising this point in highlighting an unresolved question for proponents of 
constitutional construction). 
185 Id. at 773–74. 
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details that would never be visible upon consulting a founding-era dictionary 
or examining cherry-picked sentences from historical literature. Those 
materials could tell us that the various senses of commerce (trade, production, 
all economic activity, or all intercourse) are linguistically possible; but they 
could never give us empirical data on the relative frequency of these senses 
in the relevant time period. We can now consider hard data on that 
question—assembled in a systematic, transparent manner that is subject to 
falsification. And that data, at least arguably, tells us that the original meaning 
of commerce is the trade sense of the term. 
Thus far we are just reiterating the principal contribution of corpus 
linguistics in Part V.A.1. above, as applied to commerce. But the arguably caveat 
goes to the second contribution we are highlighting here. Corpus linguistics 
can give us data on the extent of the ambiguity in the communicative content 
of the Commerce Clause. And that data can sharpen the debate over the 
propriety and basis for a closure rule (like construction or resort to an original 
legal rule of interpretation). The data on commerce show that the trade sense 
of the term appears overwhelmingly more frequently than the other proffered 
senses of the term. But they also reveal numerous uses of the term that we 
were unable to code—and thus that could conceivably represent an alternative 
sense of the term (production, all economic activity, or all intercourse). That 
suggests some degree of ambiguity—but nothing approaching “equipoise.” 
This can help to sharpen the debate about what to do next. With data 
about the degree of ambiguity, we can have a more structured debate about 
how to deal with it. One response might be to say that there is no real 
ambiguity here, and thus no need for a closure rule (like construction). If all 
the determinate semantic data available point in favor of the “trade” notion 
of commerce, then we could plausibly conclude that our best attempt at 
understanding the original communicative content of this clause leads us to 
this narrow understanding. And that could be the end of the matter—cutting 
off the need for construction or any other sort of closure rule. 
But that is not the only possibility (and our point here is not to suggest a 
single answer from the corpus data, but only to highlight the ways in which 
the data can sharpen the debate). Another possible response could be to 
highlight the number of concordance lines that were deemed indeterminate 
or uncodable. Because there is a relatively large number of lines that fall in 
that category for commerce, one could argue that there is sufficient ambiguity 
to open the door for further analysis. 
The point here is to note that McGinnis and Rappaport probably 
oversimplified when they suggested the possibility of either “equipoise” or a 
confident conclusion that the originalist case for one construction over 
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another is clearly “stronger.”186 There may be other cases where the “standard 
picture”—the view of communicative content—is simply unclear. And corpus 
data can help define the degree of ambiguity. 
We take no position here on whether the number of indeterminate 
concordance lines for commerce is sufficient to establish ambiguity. But we 
note the possibility as a step to highlight what we see as a decision tree for a 
problem like this one. If and when the originalist inquiry leads to an 
ambiguity deemed sufficient to proceed beyond the first-order inquiry into 
corpus linguistic data, the next question is how to resolve it. For a problem 
like commerce, where most of the determinate concordance lines line up with 
the “trade” sense but many other concordance lines are indeterminate, the 
next step could be to look for other means of closing the gap. 
One such means could be to parse the corpus databases further—in a 
manner that might resolve the ambiguity in favor of original intent. On commerce 
we could point to a difference in the data among the various corpora: The 
“trade” sense of commerce is even more predominately evident in the Founders 
corpus (seventy-four percent), and fewer of the concordance lines in this corpus 
were deemed indeterminate (twenty-six percent). Perhaps that could be 
enough to resolve any ambiguity. That conclusion could be a fairly comfortable 
one for the original-intent originalist. But we see no reason to foreclose this 
approach even for the original public-meaning originalist. The latter is 
principally interested in deriving the meaning that would have been evident to 
the public; but in a case of some doubt about that meaning, the doubt could be 
resolved in favor of the presumed understanding of the public about the 
intentions of the framers or ratifiers.187 
An alternative would be to look to other originalist means of resolving the 
ambiguity. Perhaps “immersion” in “texts from the relevant period” would let 
judges resolve apparent indeterminacies in the corpus.188 Or perhaps a careful 
study of the “constitutional record”—of “precursor provisions and proposals,” 
drafting history, ratification debates, early historical practice, and early 
 
186 Id. at 773. 
187 See Solum, supra note 1, at 490-91 (arguing that “the speaker must know what the audience 
knows about the speaker’s intentions and vice versa [and] so long as the author of the text and the 
reader of the text could satisfy the conditions for common knowledge of the author’s beliefs 
regarding audience recognition of the author’s intentions . . . the ‘author’s meaning’ of a text would 
be the uptake that the author intended to produce in the reader on the basis of the reader’s 
recognition of the author’s intention” (emphasis added)); see also Solum, Originalist Methodology, 
supra note 19, at 277 (“The communicative content of a writing is the content the author intended to 
convey to the reader via the audience’s recognition of the author’s communicative intention.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
188 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 16, at 1649.  
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judicial decisions—would help remove any remaining ambiguities and paint 
a sufficiently clear picture.189 
If not, we could then have a more informed debate about the propriety of 
and basis for a closure rule—of a practice of judicial construction, or of 
resolving any remaining doubt by application of an originalist tool of 
interpretation (like a canon or a presumption of constitutionality). 
Our point, again, is not to advocate for a single orthodoxy in approaching 
these problems. It is to highlight the contribution that corpus linguistic 
analysis makes for these kinds of questions—in helping to quantify the nature 
or extent of ambiguity in the communicative content of the Constitution, and 
thus to set the stage for a more informed debate about the propriety and basis 
for construction or some other closure rule. 
3. Corpus Analysis Facilitates the Debate on Whether the Constitution is 
Written in Ordinary English or in the Dialect of the Law 
Corpus linguistics can also help sharpen another debate among competing 
sub-theories of originalism. A key question at the intersection of public-
meaning originalism and methods originalism concerns the degree to which 
the Constitution is written in ordinary English or in a distinct dialect—the 
language of the law. Both sides agree that both dialects are present. But 
neither has offered a reasoned basis for drawing the distinction as to specific 
clauses. Instead the discussion is marked by gestalt linguistic intuition—with 
McGinnis and Rappaport listing some clauses of the Constitution they 
believe to be distinctly legal, others they see as having both a legal meaning 
and an ordinary meaning, and a third category of terms that “possibly have a 
legal meaning in addition to their ordinary meaning.”190 
This question is a pivotal one for the originalist inquiry into original 
communicative content. To the extent the Constitution is written in the 
language of the law, the methods originalists have a strong case for closing 
the gap on any apparent ambiguity by resorting to the shared communicative 
conventions used within the dialect of “legalese” (canons of construction and 
the like). Yet no one has proposed a means for identifying the terms in the 
Constitution that are written in this dialect. 
Corpus linguistics can fill this void. A first step, as we have noted, is to 
compare the frequency of usage of a given term in legal documents to the 
frequency of the same term in nonlegal documents. To the extent a given term 
is used much more frequently in legal documents we can reason that it may 
be a legal term of art. We say may because we do not see frequency data as 
 
189 Id. at 1655. 
190 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 1374. 
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dispositive. Certain ordinary terms may be used more frequently in legal 
materials but not have a distinctive meaning in a legal dialect. Words like 
testimony or lawyer or verdict may be examples. Those terms presumably are 
used in the same sense in ordinary parlance even though they occur more 
frequently in the dialect of the law. 
But other terms may develop a distinct meaning in law. And a more 
probing use of corpus analysis can help suss that out. To evaluate whether a 
term is used in a distinct sense in the law, we would need to code and compare 
senses of the term in concordance lines in both a legal and an ordinary English 
corpus. If the sense of the term is distinct in the legal corpus, then we may 
discern that the term has a distinct meaning in the law. 
Our corpus analysis in Part IV sheds some light on the usage of public use 
and natural born citizen. Both of these terms appear much more frequently in 
the legal corpus than in the Evans (ordinary English) corpus. That is a prima 
facie indication that these may be legal terms of art. Drilling further, we can 
see that public use seems to have a distinct meaning in legal parlance: At a 
minimum, we can say that the “direct” sense of public use appears more 
frequently in the legal corpus (78.2%) than in the corpus of ordinary English 
(61.4%), while the “indirect” sense appears relatively more frequently in 
ordinary parlance (10.8%) than in legal terminology (0.8%). That’s an 
indication that public use may have a distinct meaning in law (subject to the 
caveat presented in subsection IV.B.2 below). If those numbers were more 
distinct, such as the direct sense consisting of ninety percent  of the senses of 
public use in the legal corpus but only twenty percent in the corpus of ordinary 
English, then we would be even more confident that the direct sense was a 
legal term of art. 
The natural born citizen data is more difficult to decode. Again, we see that 
this phrase appears more frequently in the legal corpus. But that doesn’t 
necessarily mean that this phrase has a distinct meaning in law. Here, as 
noted, the data are mostly indeterminate; for the most part we just can’t tell 
whether instances of natural born citizen contemplate location-based, parent-
based, or legislative-bestowal notions of this term. The location-based notion 
appears more prominently in the Evans corpus. But we see no reason to 
believe that this is a distinct meaning of this phrase in ordinary parlance 
(different from the meaning of the phrase in legal parlance). Instead, it 
appears that all three of the competing senses are legal senses. And that renders 
the debate on legalese versus ordinary language moot. 
That tees up a response to the McGinnis and Rappaport formulation of 
the categories of terms in the Constitution. McGinnis and Rappaport suggest 
three categories of constitutional terms: those that are “unambiguously legal,” 
those that are “ambiguous” (presumably in the sense of having both legal and 
2019] Data-Driven Originalism  327 
ordinary meaning), and those that seem to have “a legal meaning in addition 
to their ordinary meaning.” Our data and analysis suggest a different way to 
conceptualize the relevant categories. If a given term is used only in the legal 
lexicon, or in other words in only a legal sense, then presumably any inquiry 
into communicative content will lead to the same place. Consider the examples 
identified by McGinnis and Rappaport for this category: habeas corpus, original 
jurisdiction, and attainder of treason. Any attempt to discern the meaning of 
these terms would lead to the same conclusion. If these are purely legal terms 
with meaning only in the dialect of the law, then it won’t matter where we go 
looking for evidence of its meaning (in a legal corpus or an ordinary one). The 
other categories are in this sense more important. The question whether the 
Constitution is using terms in a legal or ordinary sense matters only if a term 
bears meaning in both dialects—and only if that meaning differs across the 
dialects. This suggests that the point of debate between methods originalism 
and public-meaning originalism requires careful parsing of the terms of the 
Constitution as it appears in distinct corpora. And it highlights the need for 
corpus analysis to further the debate, as no other tool is capable of sussing out 
the distinction contemplated by this debate. 
B. Caveats 
The above highlights originalist questions that corpus linguistics is 
uniquely suited to answer. Here we enumerate some caveats in this use of the 
tool. Our caveats go to the range of questions for which corpus analysis seems 
to lend itself: the question of what to do when the data are indeterminate, 
and the question whether judges are capable of corpus linguistic analysis. 
1. Scope of Applicability of Corpus Linguistic Analysis 
A threshold question for corpus-based originalism concerns the scope of its 
applicability. We began this Article by reference to the “standard picture” of 
constitutional interpretation—a view of the communicative content of the words 
of the Constitution. And we have highlighted what we see as shortcomings of 
traditional methods of assessing that content while emphasizing the promise that 
corpus linguistics holds for addressing these concerns. 
But we need to mention an important caveat: The constitutional questions 
we have highlighted in this Article do not run the gamut of the range of 
problems of indeterminacy in the communicative content of the 
Constitution. The questions we propose to analyze using corpus data are 
problems of lexical ambiguity—ambiguity in the form of a contest between 
two alternative senses of a constitutional term. All the problems we discuss 
here—the meaning of domestic violence, commerce, public use, and natural born 
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citizen—are all ambiguities of this sort. We chose these examples for good 
reason. Corpus analysis, to date, has been applied most comfortably to these 
types of problems.191 And that has been our focus here. 
Yet of course this is not the only kind of indeterminacy that appears in 
the Constitution. The document also has examples of semantic or structural 
ambiguity192—ambiguity stemming from the semantic structure of the words 
(as opposed to competing senses of the terms). An example  is the “well 
regulated Militia” clause in the Second Amendment. A key point of 
ambiguity here is semantic or structural—whether the “well regulated 
Militia” clause modifies or somehow limits the right to bear arms, or is instead 
merely prefatory.193 Corpus analysis—or at least the methods we present in 
this Article—may not be of obvious use to this kind of problem.194 
That’s not to say that corpus analysis is clearly unhelpful for this kind of 
ambiguity. More thought and analysis are needed. But the cited Second 
Amendment problem presumably could benefit from some form of corpus 
analysis.195 If the question is whether prefatory clauses in law are viewed as 
capable of limiting an operative provision, then an extensive analysis of a legal 
corpus might be just the tool that is needed. We have not tried this inquiry 
and are not in a position to opine on its viability. But we see no reason to 
foreclose the possibility of this kind of analysis. If a legal corpus includes 
sufficient examples of prefatory clauses, and enough linguistic information to 
let a careful reader discern how the clause is understood as applied to 
operative provisions, then corpus linguistics could also be extended to this 
sort of problem of semantic ambiguity. 
 
191 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 871 (noting that corpus linguistics, “as currently 
conceived,” has been comfortably extended only to problems of “lexical ambiguity”). 
192 Id. at 872 n.318 (explaining that “syntactic ambiguities arise from the possibility of 
alternative constituent structures”; giving the example of “Mary saw the man with the telescope,” while 
noting that “with the telescope is either a manner adverbial modifying saw, or a prepositional phrase 
modifying the man”). 
193 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 767 (discussing this question and defending 
the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), on the ground that “the law at the 
time of the Constitution’s enactment had an accepted interpretive canon that clarified the issue”—
a canon that “held that a prefatory clause could resolve an ambiguity, but could not otherwise limit 
or expand the operative clause”). 
194 See Phillips & White, supra note 58, at 185, 233-34 (concluding that corpus linguistic analysis 
cannot determine the meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause because of the structural 
ambiguity introduced by the phrase “of any kind whatever”). 
195 See Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV. 
BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/. 
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2. Indeterminate Data 
A second question concerns the problem of indeterminate data. We see two 
potential sources of indeterminacy. The first is the more obvious—indeterminacy 
in the data mined from the relevant corpus. This is featured most prominently in 
the natural born citizen analysis above. We are hesitant to make an inference from 
the corpus data on natural born citizen because so many of the concordance lines 
that we coded were ultimately indeterminate. That problem is surely not unique 
to this clause of the Constitution. And the existence of indeterminate data will be 
a hurdle for other problems of constitutional interpretation. 
Yet this is not the only source of indeterminacy in the use of corpus-based 
originalism. Another is inherent in lexicography—in the division of senses in 
the dictionary. The division among senses of a given term is at some level 
arbitrary. Clearly there’s a great deal of subjectivity in the way that senses are 
divided.196 Linguists have no agreed-upon formula for distinguishing senses 
of a word.197 That means that our identification of a relevant set of senses will 
in some sense be arbitrary. And that complicates the attempt to derive useful 
information from the corpus data.198 
That’s one reason why the domestic violence example seems to lend itself so 
well to corpus analysis. The insurrection and household assault senses of this 
phrase are sufficiently distinct that it is fairly easy to offer confident 
conclusions from the data that we compiled. If one clearly distinct sense of a 
constitutional term is used overwhelmingly more frequently in the corpus, we 
can say fairly confidently that that is the communicative content of the term. 
 
196 Nikola Dobric, Word Sense Disambiguation Using ID Tags—Identifying Meaning in Polysemous 
Words in English, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEXIS AND 
GRAMMAR/LGC 97, 97 (Dusko Vitas & Cvetana Krstev eds., 2010) (explaining that polysemy—
multiple word meaning—is “[o]ne of the persisting issues in modern lexicography”). 
197 No one is quite sure where to draw the line—research “show[s] that different polysemy 
criteria (i.e., criteria that may be invoked to establish that a particular interpretation of a lexical item 
constitutes a separate sense rather than just being a case of vagueness or generality) may be mutually 
contradictory, or may each yield different results in different contexts.” DIRK GEERAERTS, 
THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 196 (2009). And there is no agreed-upon taxonomy of 
polysemy; some linguists speak of senses and sub-senses, see Dylan Glynn, Polysemy and Synonymy: 
Cognitive Theory and Corpus Method, in CORPUS METHODS FOR SEMANTICS: QUANTITATIVE 
STUDIES IN POLYSEMY AND SYNONYMY 7, 17 (Dylan Glynn & Justyna A. Robinson eds., 2014), 
others of more or less prototypical exemplars of senses, see, e.g., Dagmar Divjak & Antti Arppe, 
Extracting Prototypes from Exemplars: What Can Corpus Data Tell Us About Concept Representation?, 24 
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 221 (2013), and others of hyponomy and hypernomy in polysemy, see 
Glynn, supra, at 10. 
198 See James Cleith Phillips, Jacob Crump, & Benjamin Lee, Investigating the Original Meaning 
of “Officers of the United States” with the Corpus of Founding-Era American English, 37 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126975 (struggling to classify various senses of 
officer, and instead, among other things, looking at specific officers mentioned to get an idea of the 
scope of the word). 
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But other sense distinctions will be less clear. And difficult problems arise 
when the competing senses are closely related to each other—as where one is 
a more general sense encompassing the other. This seems to be the case for 
the two senses of public use. We refer to one sense as direct and the other 
indirect. But the indirect notion of public use can be thought of as the general 
category (benefit to the public), of which the direct notion (the government 
owning or directly employing) can be viewed as a specific example. And if 
that is the right way to think of this relationship, then it is difficult to know 
what to do with a predominance of direct uses of public use in the corpus. 
Does that tell us that the original communicative content of the public use 
proviso of the Takings Clause is a direct notion of use? Or does it suggest that 
the indirect notion should also be included, in that the direct notion 
encompasses the indirect one? 
These are difficult questions to answer. And they are another ground for 
a degree of hesitation in touting corpus linguistics as the answer to all 
originalist inquiries. 
That said, this does not diminish the significance of the contribution of 
corpus-based originalism. At a minimum, the move to data-driven analysis 
can remedy shortcomings in existing tools for finding original communicative 
content. With systematic data instead of cherry-picked sample sentences, we 
can have a more informed debate about the likely understanding of a given 
term or phrase in the founding era. Some such terms (like domestic violence) 
will yield clear data on distinctly separate senses of the operative language. 
And where that occurs, the inquiry into original communicative content may 
end with corpus linguistic analysis. 
That will not always be the case, of course. But even where the data are 
inconclusive, the contribution of corpus linguistics will be significant. In some 
cases, corpus analysis will just be the first step on the originalist inquiry. If the 
data are inconclusive, that can tell us that we need to look elsewhere to find an 
answer—to an original method of interpretation, to evidence of founders’ or 
ratifiers’ intent, or to a decision to open the door to a “construction zone.” 
This in itself is a contribution of corpus linguistic analysis. Our existing tools 
of interpretation make wild, opaque guesses about when the “standard picture” 
is fuzzy enough to open the door to the above and other closure rules. Corpus 
linguistics, at a minimum, can put some meat on the bones of the question 
whether the original communicative content of a given term is sufficiently 
ambiguous to call for construction or some other means of resolution. 
The degree of indeterminacy may itself be helpful in the originalist 
inquiry—depending on your chosen theory. A high degree of indeterminacy, 
for example, could properly sustain the invocation of a presumption of 
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constitutionality under a Thayerian burden of proof.199 And corpus 
linguistics, unlike any other tool of originalist inquiry, can help quantify the 
degree of clarity in the communicative content of a given provision. This 
itself is an important advancement. And it’s an advancement that stands 
despite the caveats set forth here. 
The question of when corpus linguistic analysis is enough (and when more 
research will be needed) is a difficult one. But we propose a threshold 
decisional rubric. An originalist inquiry into original communicative content 
should begin with two questions, each going to the conclusiveness of the 
corpus data. If the answer to either question is no, that suggests that some 
other originalist methodology or closure rule is likely needed. 
1. The first question is whether the corpus data points clearly in favor 
of a predominant sense of the constitutional term. 
2. The second is whether the senses of the term are sufficiently distinct 
from each other to treat them as separate. 
We would answer yes to both of those questions for our domestic violence 
analysis—and thus propose to end the originalist inquiry there. For commerce, 
we would answer yes to the first and no to the second question. That at least 
arguably opens the door to further originalist analysis. The same holds for 
public use (though the answer to the first question is even closer). And for 
natural born we probably do not even get to the second question because the 
answer to the first appears to be no. Granted, what is “sufficiently clear” and 
what is “sufficiently distinct” can be debated and will have to be fleshed out. 
But that’s a better debate to have than previous ones we’ve been having with 
traditional originalist methodology. 
3. Judicial Capacity for Corpus Linguistic Analysis 
A familiar critique of any originalist inquiry challenges the capacity of 
judges to do justice to the enterprise. Judges are not historians. It may rightly 
be said that many judges are even “bad historians” who tend to “make up an 
imaginary history and use curiously unhistorical methods.”200 This is 
sometimes cited as a reason to eschew originalism. If judges are incapable of 
conducting a reliable originalist inquiry, perhaps they shouldn’t try. 
If that critique sticks (and we think it can’t, for reasons explained below), 
then the problem is perhaps compounded as applied to data-driven 
originalism. Judges are also not corpus linguists. And it may be unrealistic to 
 
199 See Segall, supra note 12, at 28–40 (discussing founding-era practices of and views on judicial 
review, including Alexander Hamilton’s famous “irreconcilable variance” standard and St. George 
Tucker’s “absolutely and irreconcilably contradictory” standard of judicial review). 
200 MAX RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 138 (1940). 
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expect them to acquire the expertise and proficiency needed to perform the 
corpus-based analysis that we propose here.201 
This is a caveat worth noting. “Corpus data can be gathered and analyzed 
properly only with care and a little background and training in the underlying 
methodology.”202 Further, “[a] judge who proceeds willy-nilly may, either 
consciously or unwittingly, proffer data that has only the appearance of careful 
empiricism.”203 And for these reasons, we share the hesitation set forth here. 
We agree that judges will be aided by expert analysis and full adversary 
briefing. And we think judges and lawyers going forward will benefit from a 
little training in the use of corpus-based methods of inquiry. 
But again the caveat does not defeat the importance of this project. “The 
fact of the matter is that judges and lawyers are linguists.”204 That’s true in 
the sense that we are consistently called upon to resolve ambiguities in the 
language of the law. And we think that is the principal response to this final 
caveat. “[T]he question, ultimately, is not whether we trust judges to engage 
in linguistic analysis. It is whether we want them to ‘do so with the aid of—
instead of in open ignorance of or rebellion to—modern tools developed to 
facilitate that analysis.”205 The tools, moreover, are not ultimately that 
complex or difficult. “Corpus analysis is like math”206—everyone can do it at 
some basic level, while more advanced inquiries will require some real 
expertise. Much corpus analysis is fairly rudimentary. We “just think we 
should be using a calculator instead of doing it in our heads.”207 
In time, the law and corpus linguistics movement will develop standards 
and best practices for this field. And budding generations of lawyers will learn 
to employ the tools of corpus linguistics in tackling a wide range of problems 
of ambiguity in the law. Until then, we should proceed cautiously and 
carefully. However, we cannot afford to ignore this important tool. We may 
not be expert linguists or even historians. Yet for those of us who think of 
constitutional interpretation as we do (as an historical exercise), we can do no 
 
201 This point has been raised by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court, in opinions criticizing 
the proposed use (by one of us) of corpus linguistics as applied to problems of statutory 
interpretation. See State v. Rasabout,  356 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Utah 2015) (asserting that “[t]he 
knowledge and expertise required” to perform this kind of analysis is “‘not within the common 
knowledge’ of judges” and thus requires testimony from expert witnesses). 




205 Id. at 866-67. 
206 Rasabout, 356 P.2d at 1236 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(making this point in proposing the use of corpus linguistics in a case involving statutory 
interpretation). 
207 Id. 
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better than to close by quoting Justice Scalia and his co-author Bryan Garner: 
“Our charge is to try.”208 
CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINT THROUGH DATA-DRIVEN ORIGINALISM 
Some originalists have begun to question a founding tenet of the 
originalist enterprise—the idea that this approach to interpretation 
“constrains” judicial discretion.209 Perhaps it’s true that originalism, as often 
conceived, is not the most constraining theory of interpretation that we can 
imagine.210 But concerns about the demise of this premise—constraint—are 
surely exaggerated. And we think the theory and methodology of this Article 
can help to show why. 
Will Baude suggests that “there are . . . probably methodologies that 
are . . . better at” imposing “external constraint” on judges.211 The examples 
he gives are “heavy deference to other branches or strong stare decisis.”212 But 
these aren’t freestanding theories of interpretation. No one believes in always 
deferring to other branches of government on constitutional matters. And 
even an ironclad rule of deference to precedent leaves new constitutional 
questions not resolved by precedent. So to get to the theories that Baude 
imagines to be more constraining you would have to start with a threshold 
theory—a theory for discerning the bedrock foundation of the Constitution 
that other branches of government are held to, or that tells you what to do 
when you have no controlling precedent. 
That leaves us with either originalism or some form of anti-originalism 
like pragmatism. And originalism is easily more constraining than some free-
form notion of pragmatism.213 Constraint, moreover, is more than just precise 
determinacy—the identification of a single right answer that everyone would 
agree on.214 The originalist inquiry, at a minimum, reduces the breadth of a 
 
208 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 400. 
209 See Baude, supra note 7, at 2215 (suggesting that proponents of the “constraint” premise of 
originalism “no longer have a clear champion”); Colby, supra note 7, at 714-15 (2011) (asserting that 
“[j]udicial constraint” was once the “heart and soul” of originalism but that originalism has since 
“sold its soul to gain respect and adherents”). 
210 See Baude, supra note 7, at 2223 (suggesting that “theories centered around heavy deference to 
other branches or strong stare decisis . . . could make it easier to judge the judiciary’s behavior, because 
it is comparatively transparent when a law is being struck down or a precedent is being overruled”). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 See id. (explaining that originalism “compares favorably to ‘pragmatism’—under which it’s 
wickedly difficult to tell whether its practitioners are doing it right or wrong”); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2062 (2006) (“The 
existence of reasonably firm criteria [in originalism] makes it easier to check up on originalist 
interpretations for the soundness of their reasoning and their adherence to correct principles.”). 
214 See Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18) (on file with authors) (noting that originalism may fail “to 
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judge’s discretion.215 And it yields at least “internal constraints”—in allowing 
“individual interpreters to come up with their own best assessments of 
constitutional meaning.”216 This sort of constraint may not “easily yield 
consensus or rule most interpretations out of bounds as implausible”; yet 
originalism can “still provide a method that can be divorced from various 
nonlegal considerations.”217 And corpus linguistics, in our view, can help to 
discipline all the foregoing mechanisms of constraint. 
Corpus analysis may yield data-backed grounds for more points of clear 
“consensus” in the communicative content of the Constitution. And it may 
let us more clearly rule out more interpretations of the document as 
“implausible.” The tool, at a minimum, gives us the ability to assemble 
empirical support for conclusions along these lines. And where we have such 
data we may have a solid basis for an external constraint on judges. 
The domestic violence example illustrates the point. Without the data we present 
herein a judge could plausibly contend that the original meaning of the Domestic 
Violence Clause could be understood to encompass problems of household assault. 
Through dictionary analysis or otherwise, a degree of doubt could be cast on the 
view that there is only one clear way to understand domestic violence, or that the 
household assault sense of the term is untenably implausible. But the corpus data 
rules that out. We now know that the Domestic Violence Clause is limited to acts 
of insurrection. And we can point to originalism as a basis for an external constraint 
on a judge who is inclined to rule otherwise. 
The commerce data is less constraining. But it is somewhat constraining. 
For reasons noted above we may not be able to say conclusively that the 
founding-era notion of commerce is clearly limited to the trade sense of the 
term—too many of our concordance lines were indeterminate to be certain, 
and some of the competing senses of commerce are too closely related to deem 
them exclusive of others. Yet the data can still provide a degree of 
constraint—and at least an internal limitation allowing interpreters to come 
up with their own best sense of constitutional meaning. A judge who takes 
original meaning seriously, for example, would have a very difficult time 
 
produce unique and indisputable answers” to some constitutional questions (quoting Andrew 
Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1919 
(2012)). 
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discretion without eliminating it); Colby, supra note 7, at 751 (noting that “New Originalists” posit 
that originalism is “still meaningfully constraining” even if it “does not completely eliminate judicial 
subjectivity”); Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice 
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justifying a production sense of commerce in light of our data. The all-
intercourse sense is almost equally implausible. What about the economic 
activity sense? Perhaps that could not be rejected outright as utterly untenable 
(for reasons we noted). But the data would provide a basis for choosing the 
trade sense of commerce over the others. And that basis could yield at least 
internal constraint in the sense noted above—of giving the judge a method 
“divorced from nonlegal considerations” for deciding the case. The 
transparency of the methodology, moreover, means that others can more 
easily check a judge’s conclusions from the data. That also provides an 
internal check to the judge, who will have an incentive to be more careful with 
his methodology and conclusions. 
Corpus analysis is useful—and in a sense constraining—even to the extent 
it leaves a given question of original meaning indeterminate. The data, at a 
minimum, can tell us when we cannot be sure of the original communicative 
content of a provision of the Constitution. And that in itself is useful. It will 
cue up further steps in an originalist decision tree—as to the invocation of 
any of a series of closure rules (in opening the construction zone, employing 
a presumption of constitutionality, or turning to original methods of 
interpretation). These methods themselves may not always lead to a single 
answer of universal acclaim. But they will at least narrow the bounds of 
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